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INTRODUCTION 
The central question in this appeal is whether a plaintiff can circumvent the 
clearly stated repose period in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act") 
by broadly alleging that the health care provider affirmatively acted fraudulently 
to conceal his misconduct. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404. Utah law makes clear that 
a statute of repose cannot be equitably tolled. Jensen v. Intermountain Healthcare, 
Inc., 2018 UT 27, 'l[ 30 n.5, 424 P.3d 885. Indeed, by their very nature, statutes of 
repose "generally may not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary circumstances 
beyond a plaintiff's control." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014) 
( explaining that "a repose period is fixed and its expiration will not be delayed by 
estoppel or tolling" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). "Statutes of 
repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability 
after legislatively determined period of time." Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Thus, the answer is clear, something more than a conclusory 
allegation is necessary to overcome the Act's repose period, if at all possible. 
In this appeal, Appellees each commenced malpractice actions against the 
Appellants, alleging that they underwent medically unnecessary procedures 
performed by Dr. Sherman Sorensen. They also allege that the hospital at which 
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the procedure was performed knew Dr. Sorensen performed an unusually high 
number of cardiac procedures and encouraged Dr. Sorensen business for financial 
gain. Each Appellee alleges that they underwent the procedure between 2008 and 
010. They also allege that Dr. Sorensen stopped performing these procedures in 
2012. But none of the Appellees commenced their malpractice actions until January 
2017 or later. Thus, it is generally undisputed that Appellees actions are time-
barred by the Act's four-year repose period. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404(1). 
Appellees nevertheless broadly allege that they may proceed under a 
statutory exception in the Act that allows for more time to commence an action 
when the medical provider affirmatively and fraudulently concealed his 
malpractice. Id. § 78B-3-404(2)(b ). The Act specifically provides: 
[I]n an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider 
because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Id. But the district court generally concluded that a plaintiff need not allege 
fraudulent concealment or equitable tolling with any level of particularity because 
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they were not expected to plead facts in anticipation of affirmative defenses. This 
cannot be correct. 
When read as a whole, the Act's repose period serves no other purpose than 
to provide a maximum cutoff for filing claims. The Legislature explicitly explained 
that the purpose of the Act was to "provide a reasonable time in which actions 
may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific 
period." Id. § 78B-3-402(3). As such, the statute of repose may not be tolled. 
In any event, "when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the 
right sued upon has been extinguished, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
a factual basis for tolling the statute." Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc,, 627 F.2d 
1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding statute of repose question may be 
decided on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss); Young Res. Ltd. P'ship v. Promontory 
Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 'I[ 31,427 P.3d 457 ("[W]hen the face of the complaint 
would otherwise establish that the claims are time-barred, a plaintiff presumably 
bears some burden to invoke the discovery rule."). To meet this burden at the 
pleading stage, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to toll the applicable 
limitations period. Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, 'I[ 55, 132 P.3d 63; accord Tracey 
v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263,266 (Utah 1931) (" Apparently all courts are agreed, and in this 
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case it is conceded that the burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove facts 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations."). Indeed, by the plain language of the 
statutory exception, a plaintiff must allege certain information including fraud and 
some affirmative act on the health care provider's part to trigger the exception. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404(2)(b). 
Moreover, "the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know 
nor should he have reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in 
time to reasonably comply with the limitations period." Young Res., 2018 UT App 
99, 'l[ 27 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "If a plaintiff had no such 
burden, 'a statute of limitations defense that is subject to the discovery rule could 
never be successfully asserted in a motion to dismiss, and that is clearly not the 
rule."' Id. 'l[ 31 (quoting Butler v. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Inc., 2006-NMCA-084, 'l[ 
33, 140 P.3d 532). 
The Amended Complaints allege no facts showing that, even taken as true, 
Dr. Sorensen affirmatively acted fraudulently to conceal his misconduct. 
Appellees failed to plead fraudulent concealment with any level of particularity as 
required by Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, they 
completely failed to allege facts that can show that they were diligent in pursuing 
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their claim, that can show their actions were commenced within one year from 
discovering the alleged fraud, or that can show how the alleged concealment 
prevented discovery. Thus, considering the purpose of the repose period and that 
they have done nothing to show that they were prevented from discovering their 
cause of action, Appellees' claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: The first issue turns on whether the Act's repose period can be tolled 
by a simple allegation of fraudulent concealment under the Statute's plain 
language. 
Preservation of Issue: (Bright 26-27, 245-247, 379-80, 658-59; Merlo 169-171, 
401-02, 629-63, 663; Tapp 333.) 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a statutory construction question that 
appellate courts review for correctness. Jensen v. Intermountain Healthcare, 
Inc., 2018 UT 27, 'l[ 5, 424 P.3d 885. 
2. Issue: The second issue is whether the trial courts erred when it determined 
that Appellees were not required to plead the Act's fraudulent concealment 
exception with any amount of particularity. 
Preservation of Issue: (Bright 382-383; Merlo 401-03; Tapp 337-38.) 
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Standard of Review: This issue also presents a statutory construction question 
that appellate courts review for correctness. Id. Moreover, reviewing a 
court's decision to grant or deny rule 12(b )(6) motion to dismiss is a question 
of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, 'l[ 19,258 P.3d 539. 
3. Issue: The third issue is whether Appellees sufficiently pleaded their claim 
for fraudulent concealment to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Preservation of Issue: (Bright 247-248, 380-81, 441; Merlo 177-180; Tapp 333-
337.) 
Standard of Review: "A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts 
alleged in the complaint, but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based 
on those facts." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). But 
legal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as fact do not bind the 
court. As such, the court looks to the sufficiency of the pleadings, Oakwood 
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 'l['l[ 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226, giving no 
deference to the district court's determination, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mtn. 
Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29, 'l['l[ 10-11, 232 P.3d 999. 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The three cases in this appeal are just a few of more than a thousand making 
their way through litigation. Although the exact details of each case differ 
somewhat, the pertinent allegations in each of the cases are the same. Every 
plaintiff is a former patient of Dr. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen, an interventional 
cardiologist, specialized in treating defects in the wall of tissue that separates the 
upper chambers of the heart, commonly referred to as "holes in the heart." He had 
privileges at various hospitals in the Salt Lake valley, including St. Mark's Hospital 
and Intermountain Medical Center. Dr. Sorensen retired in 2012. 
In particular, between 2002 and 2012, Dr. Sorensen performed procedures 
to close the holes in the heart. (Bright 85-87, Merlo 98-105, Tapp 124-132.) 
Depending on the location and particularities of the defect, the opening is known 
as a patent foramen ovale ("PFO") or atrial septal defect (" ASD"). (Id.) These 
conditions are associated with an increased risk of stroke because blood clots can 
pass through the defect, bypassing the lungs, and travel to the brain. (Id.) 
Treatment for a PFO or ASD is accomplished by closing the defect using one of 
several devices designed for this purpose. The device is placed by echo-guided 
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cardiac catheter through the femoral artery. After the device is placed, over time, 
tissue grows over the device and completely closes the defect. 
Appellees generally allege that Dr. Sorensen misrepresented that the 
PFO/ASD procedure was absolutely necessary as opposed to elective or merely 
preventative. (Bright 82-102; Merlo 122-148; Tapp 96-115.) They assert Dr. 
Sorensen fraudulently induced them into having the procedure. Appellees also 
allege that Dr. Sorensen made fraudulent notations in their medical records to 
justify the procedures. Furthermore, they allege that the hospitals knew of Dr. 
Sorensen's fraud or misrepresentations and encouraged him for financial gain. 
Based on the Salient Dates in the Complaint Appellees' Actions Were Filed Past 
the Act's Four-Year Statute of Repose 
Appellees' allegations make clear that their claims were commenced more 
than four years after Dr. Sorensen's alleged misconduct. Indeed, they allege that 
Dr. Sorensen only performed procedures or practiced until 2012. All malpractice 
actions were commenced in January 2017 or later. (Bright 3-9, 87-92; Merlo 4-8, 98-
105; Tapp 5-9, 126-138.) 
In particular, Appellee Johannah Bright underwent PSO closure on 
December 15, 2009, but did not request prelitigation review of her medical 
malpractice claim until January 2, 2017. (Bright 4-9, 69, 87-92.) After the 
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conclusion of the statutorily required administrative procedures before DOPL, Ms. 
Bright filed her complaint on September 25, 2017, alleging medical malpractice 
claims against Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark's. (Id. at 17.) Ms. Bright alleges that she 
only discovered the alleged misconduct until "recently ... as a result [of] lawyer 
advertising." (Id. at 131.) 
With regard to Appellee Pia Merlo-Schmucker, she started seeing Dr. 
Sorensen in 2010 and underwent a closure procedure on February 10, 2011. (Merlo 
98-101.) But Ms. Merlo-Schmucker did not request prelitigation review until 
January 3, 2017 (Id. at 184) and did not file her complaint against Dr. Sorensen and 
St. Mark's until September 26, 2017 (Id. at 16). She has made virtually identical 
allegations as Ms. Bright, asserting that she did not discover the alleged 
misconduct until "recently ... as a result [of] lawyer advertising." (Id. at 105.) 
Appellee Lisa Tapp underwent a PFO procedure September 18, 2008 and 
was seen by Dr. Sorensen until October 2008. (Tapp 7-9, 132-38.) But she did not 
request prelitigation review until January 17, 2017 (Id. at 82) and only filed her 
action against Dr. Sorensen and IHC in the district court on August 4, 2017 (Id. at 
17). Ms. Tapp's alleges she learned of Dr. Sorensen's alleged misconduct "through 
lawyer advertising in 2017." (Id. at 145.) She claims she "did not know, nor should 
9 
have known, of the cause of action against Defendants prior to being put on notice 
... in 2017."1 (Id. at 146.) 
Fraudulent Concealment Allegations 
To circumvent the Act's four-year statute of repose, Appellees alleged 
"Fraudulent Non-Disclosure/Concealment" and "Equitable Tolling/Fraudulent 
Concealment." These claims were made in Appellees' first complaints. (Bright 12-
13, 16-17; Merlo-Schmucker 11-12, 15-16; Tapp 13, 16-17.) They even amended 
their complaints to include additional factual allegations apparently to support 
these claims. (Bright 96-97, 99-11; Merlo-Schmucker 109-110, 112-113; Tapp 142, 
145-146.) 
Each Appellees' allegations are virtually identical to the other. Indeed, the 
allegations are so conclusory and broad that the allegations could apply to any 
plaintiff. The allegations show nothing about Appellees' specific inability to 
discover their cause of action or any specific subsequent action by Dr. Sorensen 
designed to conceal their cause of action. At most, Appellees re-allege the original 
1. Notably, Ms. Tapp asserts that she did not discover the alleged misconduct until 
2017 (Tapp 145) but filed her notice to commence an action in November 2016 (Id. 
at 82, 91-95). 
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tortious behavior that purportedly induced them to have the elective procedure. 
Specifically, Ms. Bright alleges: 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULENT NON-
DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
65. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
66. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, 
such as the medical necessity of Plaintiff's medical care, to Plaintiff. 
67. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to 
Plaintiff was not medically necessary and failed to disclose this to 
Plaintiff. 
68. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by 
Defendants was not medically necessary. 
69. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiff's medical care 
was not necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's 
damages. Had Plaintiff known that her closure surgery was not 
necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
70. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and 
special damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
85. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
86. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and 
misleading conduct, Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
87. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff's cause of 
action. Given Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a 
11 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the cause of action 
earlier. 
88. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's ever notified Plaintiff that she 
had received an unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated 
for the surgery to begin with, that the device implanted into Plaintiff 
was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no 
medical purpose, and that the informed consent contained 
fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete statements. Neither 
Sorenson, nor St. Mark's, ever compensated Plaintiff for the 
unnecessary medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs 
of the procedure. 
89. Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark's, ever made a public statement, 
sent a letter, made a public announcement, or issued a press release 
to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may have had medically 
unnecessary closures. 
90. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct 
constitutes fraudulent concealment that tolls any proffered statute of 
limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery sought by Plaintiff. 
91. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of 
action against Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' 
potential liability recently. She neither discovered, nor reasonably 
should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action 
before any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
92. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, 
quality and nature of their conduct, they are estopped from relying 
on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' affirmative acts and 
omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff's 
injury prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof 
until recently. Such conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b ). 
93. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was 
known or should have been known by them to be dangerous, 
12 
heedless, reckless, and without regard to the consequences or the 
rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
(Bright 135-136, 138-139.) Ms. Merlo-Schmucker and Ms. Bright have asserted 
identical allegations to support their "fraudulent concealment" and tolling claims. 
(See Merlo-Schmucker 109-110, 112-113.) Ms. Tapp's allegations only differ 
slightly, and the differences are not material. (Tapp 142, 145-146.) 
Procedural Posture 
This appeal stems from three interlocutory orders denying Appellants' 
motions to dismiss. Each motion to dismiss was decided by a different judge in the 
Third District Court, but the decisions were similar. Each district court judge 
voiced at least some uncertainty about whether the motions to dismiss should be 
granted or denied, but ultimately decided to allow the cases to proceed. 
Johannah Bright 
On December 8, 2017, Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark's moved to dismiss Ms. 
Bright's complaint under rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing 
her complaint was barred by the Act's four-year statute of repose. (Bright 20-38.) 
Ms. Bright then amended her complaint to include additional factual allegations 
in support of her fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling arguments. (Id. at 
82-102.] On January 18, 2018, Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark's again moved to dismiss 
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the case on similar grounds as before. (Id. at 228-251.) Ms. Bright filed a combined 
response on February 1, 2018. (Id. at 255-278.) 
Judge Laura Scott denied Dr. Sorensen's motion in a written Ruling and 
Order Re Pending Motions to Dismiss. (Id. at 372-373, 374-390.] In relevant part, 
the district court made three major findings. First, it determined that Ms. Bright 
was not required to plead fraudulent concealment with any level of particularity 
as required by Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 380-81.) "The 
court is not convinced that Rule 9(c) requires a plaintiff to plead defensive 
fraudulent concealment in her complaint in anticipation that a defendant may 
assert the statute of limitation or statute of repose in a motion to dismiss." (Id. at 
380.) 
Second, the court rejected the argument that the Act's fraudulent 
concealment exception requires a showing of a subsequent affirmative act to 
fraudulently conceal the health care provider's misconduct. (Id. 380-82.) It further 
concluded that, in any event, Ms. Bright has alleged some affirmative acts after the 
surgery, including his follow-up treatment and billing." (Id. at 382.) 
Finally, the court determined that whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable 
diligence in not bringing her claims timely "is a fact-intensive matter for the fact 
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finder to ascertain except in only 'the clearest of cases."' (Id.) It appears to have 
relied on equitable tolling considerations, not the plain language of the statutory 
exceptions. (Id. at 382-383.) 
Pia Merlo-Schmucker 
On November 30, 2017, Dr. Sorensen and St. Mark's moved to dismiss Ms. 
Merlo-Schmucker's complaint under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, arguing that her complaint was barred by the Act's four-year statute of 
repose. (Merlo 19-36.] Ms. Merlo-Schmucker amended her complaint to include 
additional factual allegation. (Id. at 96-115.) On January 18, 2018, Dr. Sorensen and 
St. Mark's moved to dismiss her amended complaint on similar grounds. (Id. at 
190-212.) Ms. Merlo-Schmucker filed a combined response, arguing that she was 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of the health care provider 
because the provider had affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct. (Id. at 216-239, 243-266.) 
After full briefing and argument on the motions, Judge Patrick Corum 
explained: 
It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant 
acted affirmatively within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently 
conceal anything. The word "affirmatively" was presumably and 
advisedly put in the statute-78B-3-404(1)-with meaning, and it 
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appears to have a meaning different from the common law. Under the 
statute, some affirmative act of concealment is necessary to maintain 
an otherwise time-barred action. Defendants' argument that inaction 
or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar 
appears to be well taken. 
That being said the Court is not convinced this issue is 
procedurally ripe at the Rule 12(b) stage and questions whether the 
Plaintiff is obligated to combat an affirmative defense, however, likely 
or inevitably it is to be raised, in its initial pleading. 
(Id. at 490.) The court further determined that Ms. Merlo-Schmucker alleged facts 
with just enough detail "than what was apparently pied in [Roth v. Pederson, 2009 
UT App 313]" to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (Id. at 490-91.) But 
somewhat conversely, it concluded that Ms. Merlo-Schmucker' s Amended 
Complaint pleaded her fraud-based claims, including fraudulent concealment, 
with enough particularity to meet the requirements of Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 491.) The court therefore denied Dr. Sorensen's motion 
to dismiss. 
Lisa Tapp 
On October 24, 2017, Dr. Sorensen and IHC moved to dismiss Ms. Tapp's 
complaint. (Tapp 26-43, 50-80.) Ms. Tapp then amended her complaint to allege 
additional facts on November 21, 2017. (Id. at 122-148.) Again, Dr. Sorensen and 
IHC moved to dismiss. (Id. at 327-343.) 
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Judge Barry Lawrence denied the motions on August 9, 2018. (Tapp 732-
739.) The district court "conclude[d] that it cannot rule on the statute of 
limitation/repose defense based on the pleadings." (Id. at 734.) Essentially, like the 
other two courts, Judge Lawrence determined that Ms. Bright was "not obligated 
to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in response to the statute of 
limitations/repose defense" and "not obligated to meet the heightened pleading 
requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending defense." 
(Id.) In any event, during the hearing on the motions, Judge Lawrence noted, 
particularly given the volume of cases and the importance of the issues, it "would 
make a lot of sense from a judicial economy perspective" for the appellate court to 
review the issues raised in Dr. Sorensen's and IHC's motions to dismiss on an 
interlocutory basis. (Id. 974-976.) 
In sum, although the district court expressed doubt that Appellees' 
allegations demonstrated fraudulent concealment, each court essentially 
determined that it did not matter. It concluded a plaintiff need not plead facts to 
support fraudulent concealment in a complaint because it would require a plaintiff 
to anticipate the defendant's statute of limitations defense. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In this appeal, Dr. Sorensen argues that Appellees' actions are time-barred 
by the repose period in the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404. The Act contains a 
provision with a statute of limitations and a repose period and a provision with 
two broad exceptions. First, Dr. Sorensen argues the repose period is an absolute 
cutoff period for commencing malpractice actions. Based on the plain language of 
the Act, a plaintiff cannot commence an action more than two years from the date 
they discover their injury, except where the case involves the health care provider 
leaving a foreign object in the plaintiff's person and where the plaintiff learns that 
the provider affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal their claim. Id. But under 
no circumstances may an action be commenced after four years from the alleged 
misconduct or malpractice. Id. The exceptions do not toll the Act's repose period. 
Indeed, to allow the exceptions to toll the Act's statute of repose would render the 
repose period meaningless and would unnecessarily read a conflict in the Act 
where none exists. 
In any event, even if the court finds that the repose period may be tolled, it 
can be tolled only by alleging facts that can support the elements of the statutory 
exception. So, once it is established that the action has been commenced past the 
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applicable repose period, the plaintiff carries the burden to establish a prima facie 
showing that a statutory exception tolls the repose period. Indeed, this court has 
recently held that a statute of repose cannot be equitably tolled and that if a repose 
period can be tolled it must be by statute. Therefore, the court is not to consider 
the equitable reasons for tolling as Appellees and the lower courts suggest, but 
whether Appellees have alleged facts that can support the elements of the 
statutory exception. 
Keeping in mind the standard of review for a motion to dismiss, Appellees 
have failed to allege any facts that would support applying the Act's statutory 
exception. In relevant part, Appellees allege that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b) 
tolls the Act's repose period, arguing that Dr. Sorensen fraudulently concealed his 
malpractice. The plain language of the subsection states: 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of the health care provider 
because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404(2)(b). It expressly requires the plaintiff or patient to 
make certain allegations, including facts to show that they were prevented from 
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discovering the misconduct because the health care provider affirmatively acted 
to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct and that the action was 
commenced within one year of the discovery of the fraud using reasonable 
diligence. Id. 
Here, in their original complaints, Appellees raised the issue of tolling and 
fraudulent concealment in the first instance. (Bright 12, 16-17; Merlo 11-12, 15-16; 
Tapp 13, 16-17.) Now they claim there is nothing that requires them to allege 
sufficient facts to support those claims. Appellees were even afforded the 
opportunity to amend their complaints. (Bright 96-100; Merlo 109-113; Tapp 142-
146.) Yet, they have failed to make any allegations that shows that Dr. Sorensen 
made any subsequent act to conceal the alleged misconduct. They do not even 
allege facts showing that Dr. Sorensen took any actions except the purported 
original malpractice. Appellees have made no effort to establish that they tried to 
discover their claim and were somehow prevented from discovering their cause 
of action by Dr. Sorensen's concealment. And Appellees have failed to plead any 
of their allegations of fraudulent concealment with any amount of particularity as 
required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They do not allege facts 
that can support the claim that they were diligent in making their claim. To the 
20 
contrary, Appellees simply claim they were blamelessly ignorant until a recent 
lawyer's advertisement. As a result, The Amended Complaints are insufficiently 
pleaded and should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
Statutes of repose are a vital part of our legal landscape. They are 
promulgated for the welfare of society, especially in the context of medical 
malpractice where standards of care are ever-changing to keep up with 
developments in medicine. A statute or repose "puts an outer limit on the right to 
bring a civil action." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014); Berry ex rel Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672-73 (Utah 1985) (explaining that a "statute 
of repose is sweeping and absolute once the statutory period has lapsed). And "the 
injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered" for the repose 
period to apply. Id. In sum, repose periods "represent a pervasive legislative 
judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a 
specified period of time and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in time comes 
to prevail over the right to prosecute them."' United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 
117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 
349 (1944)). 
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Although the "absolute bar" created by a statute of repose may seem 
harsh, their purpose justifies their existence. Justice Jackson explained: 
Statutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and 
convenience rather than logic. They represent expedients, rather than 
principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the 
courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put 
to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or 
disappeared, and evidence has been lost. They are by definition 
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just 
and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They 
have come into the law not through judicial process but through 
legislation. They represent public policy about the privilege to 
litigate. 
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (citations omitted). With 
regard to the Act, the Legislature weighed the competing interests of the parties 
and determined that the plaintiff's right to commence a civil action ends after four 
years from the alleged malpractice. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(3). Specifically, 
In enacting [the Act], it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health 
care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and 
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(3). "It is therefore seen that the Act was premised 
upon the need to protect and insure the continued availability of health care 
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services to the public." Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 
1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act's statute of limitations). 
Statutes of repose reconcile various competing interests. On one hand, they 
encourage plaintiffs to pursue diligently their claims which ensures evidende 
remains, witnesses are available, and memories are fresh. 
Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, 
they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered 
judicial system. Making out the substantive elements of a claim for 
relief involves a process of pleading, discovery, and trial. The process 
of discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate facts for 
or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more reliable 
if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh. Thus in the 
judgment of most legislatures and courts, there comes a point at 
which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely 
either to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset 
settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred without 
respect to whether it is meritorious. 
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 
(asserting that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from 
having to deal with cases which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by 
loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading 
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise"). On the other hand, repose 
periods allow peace of mind for the defendant, prevent disrupting settled 
expectations, reduce uncertainty about the future, and reduce the costs of litigating 
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untimely claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-402(3); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 116-17. 
"Considering the function of a statute of limitations as a device for repose a 
potential defendant's equities are the same whether the plaintiff knows of his 
condition or not." Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142, 145 
(N.Y. 1963). 
Importantly, several courts have attributed to statutes of repose the function 
of filtering out those claims which are spurious, inconsequential, and unfounded, 
because meritorious claims "are not usually allowed to remain neglected." 
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 4 U.S. 386, 390 (1868). "The lapse of years without 
any attempt to enforce a demand creates ... a presumption against its original 
validity, or that it has ceased to subsist." Id. In other words, some courts hold "the 
very purpose of the statute of limitations was to prevent fraud." Pashley v. Pacific 
Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 328 (Cal. 1944). "It is hard to say for certain, but perhaps the 
possibility of feigned cases against unprepared defendants and the difficulties of 
proof in meritorious cases led to a decision that society is best served by complete 
repose after a certain number of years even at the sacrifice of a few unfortunate 
cases." Schwartz, 188 N.E.2d at 145. 
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Accordingly, given their distinct purpose, statutes of repose "may preclude 
an alleged tortfeasor' s liability before a plaintiff is entitled to sue, before an 
actionable harm ever occurs." CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 17. They are not subject to 
equitable tolling and "generally may not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary 
circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control." Id. at 9; Jensen v. Intermountain 
Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27, 'l[ 30 n.5, 424 P.3d 885 ( explaining that statutes of repose 
cannot be equitably tolled). Therefore, "when the dates given in the complaint 
make clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished, the plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing a factual basis for tolling the statute." Aldrich v. McCulloch 
Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980); Young Res. Ltd. P'ship v. 
Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 'l[ 31, 427 P.3d 457 ("[W]hen the face of 
the complaint would otherwise establish that the claims are time-barred, a plaintiff 
presumably bears some burden to invoke the discovery rule."). 
Here, the Act's repose period is absolute and cannot be tolled. But, even if it 
can be tolled, the four-year statute of repose cannot be equitably tolled. Appellees 
must allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie showing of the statutory 
exception under Utah Code subsection 78B-3-404(2)(b). As a result, to survive a 
motion to dismiss, Appellees must plead facts that, if taken as true, can prove that 
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Appellants affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal his alleged misconduct. By 
its plain language, the Act also requires Appellees to show that they pursued their 
claims diligently. As established below, Appellees' claims fail and should be 
dismissed. 
I. THE ACT'S REPOSE IS NOT TOLLED BY SUBSECTION (2). 
To read Subsection (2) as a toll on the statute of repose would unjustifiably 
find an inconsistency where none exists and would render the repose period 
meaningless. "It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory 
interpretation, [the] primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, 'I[ 14,267 P.3d 863 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The best evidence of the 
legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Id. ( citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). But "we do not interpret the 'plain meaning' of 
a statutory term in isolation." Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, 'I[ 12, 248 
P.3d 465. Instead, the task "is to determine the meaning of the text given the 
relevant context of the statute (including, particularly, the structure and language 
of the statutory scheme)." Id. (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 
(1991) ("[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."). 
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Generally, the Act provides a two-year statute of limitations and a four-year 
statute of repose, followed by two broad exceptions. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404. 
It states, 
Id, 2 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the 
date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care 
provider is that foreign object has been wrongfully left within 
a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in 
the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health 
care provider because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
2. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed a similar issue based on an earlier 
version of the Act in Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28,976 P.2d 1202. There, in concluding 
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When read in isolation, the phrase "Notwithstanding Subsection (1)" may 
suggest that the exceptions displace Subsection (1) altogether. An argument may 
that Subsection (2) tolled only the statute of repose, the Court used basic canons of 
construction, including the "last antecedent" rule. Id. '['[ 10-11, 27. But the 
ambiguous language analyzed by the Court is no longer in the Act. Compare Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-14-4(1) (1996), with id.§ 78B-3-404 (2008). 
In 2008 the Legislature recodified and amended the Act, replacing only the 
language-"except that" -interpreted by this Court in Day. Recodification, 
Revision, and Renumber of Title 78, ch. 3, 2008 Utah Laws 710 (codified as 
amended as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404 (2008)). Arguably, the Legislature's 
amendment indicates a rejection of the Day court's interpretation. Nonetheless, the 
Day court's analysis and conclusion is no longer applicable. For instance, the new 
language does not fall within the parameters of the last antecedent rule because 
the new language is an entirely new provision. It can no longer be read as a 
qualifier of preceding terms. Thus, although Day may appear relevant to this 
appeal, this Court must analyze the Act anew, interpreting the plain language of 
the current statute to give effect to the Legislature's decision to amend the 
language. 
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even be made that the Act is ambiguous because the language might be susceptible 
to at least three meanings-that the exceptions toll (1) the statute of limitations 
only; (2) the statute of repose only; or (3) both the statute of limitations and the 
statute of repose. But these conclusions lose their validity with context and 
consideration of the Act's purpose. 
"The fact that the statutory language may be susceptible to multiple 
meanings does not render it ambiguous; 'all but one of the meanings is ordinarily 
eliminated by context."' Olsen, 2011 UT 10, '][ 13 (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 
U.S. 129, 131-132 (1993)). As such, "the statutory text may not be 'plain' when read 
in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory 
context." Id. 'I[ 9. In other words, "[w]henever a statute is susceptible of two 
plausible interpretations, it will always be the case that the legislature could have 
spoken more clearly if it had anticipated the precise question before the court. But 
that fact is hardly ever material, since one can almost always imagine clarifying 
amendments cutting both ways." In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, 'II 75, 266 
P.3d 702 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Therefore, 
the court should read statutory language to determine whether any perceived 
ambiguity can be eliminated by context. Olsen, 2011 UT 10, 'I[ 13. 
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Furthermore, it is the court's "duty, if possible, to adopt that interpretation 
which will give effect to each provision and harmonize them with each other, so 
that neither will be meaningless." Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 216 P. 
684, 685 (Utah 1923). "[E]ffect is to be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and as far as practicable reconcile the different provisions so as to make 
them consistent and harmonious and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to 
each." Id. "Hence there can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions 
in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012). The plain 
language of the Act must therefore be read as a whole and in a way that avoids an 
interpretation "which renders parts or words in a statute inoperable or 
superfluous." State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, 'I[ 11,395 P.3d 92 (citation omitted). 
A. Reading the Statute's Repose Period as an Absolute Bar Renders the 
Provisions Harmonious and Makes the Most Sense Given the 
Context. 
The gap between the limitations and the repose periods in Subsection (1) 
shows that the Legislature expressly contemplates that under certain 
circumstances an action may be commenced after the expiration of the two-year 
limitations period. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1). But it unequivocally provides 
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that no action may be commenced after the four-year repose period. Id. There 
could be up to a two-year gap between the end of the limitations period and the 
four-year repose period. Id. Thus, in context, the exceptions enumerated in 
Subsection (2) provides the ways the Legislature anticipated the plaintiff or patient 
could commence an action after the two-year limitations period-within the gap 
between expiration of the limitations and repose period. Id. § 78B-3-404(2). 
To interpret the Act otherwise would create inconsistences where none 
exist. The repose period does not conflict with the limitations in Subsection (2)(b ), 
and therefore does not need to be reconciled away. The repose period runs 
regardless of whether the plaintiff or patient has or could have discovered the 
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. Id. § 78B-3-404(1). Put another way, 
the patient's knowledge of the alleged malpractice has no bearing on the running 
of the repose period. By contrast, the application of the limitations period and the 
exceptions in Subsection (2) rest on the time in which the plaintiff or patient 
discovered or should have discovered certain information. Compare Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-3-404(1), with id.§ 78B-3-404(2)(b). In those instances, the Act expressly 
requires the plaintiff to use diligence to discover the necessary information to 
commence an action. But no such requirement exists regarding the running of the 
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repose period. So, while the exception could conflict with the Act's limitation 
period, it does not conflict with the repose. 
Read as a whole, the Legislature has expressly carved out an exception for 
when the plaintiff or patient could not have discovered the necessary information 
within the ordinary two-year period because of the healthcare providers' fraud. 
This accounts for the circumstances for which the Legislature anticipated a 
plaintiff could commence an action in the gap between the two-year limitations 
period and the four-year repose period. 
This makes sense considering the legislative history of health care 
malpractice actions in Utah. Before the Act was enacted, malpractice actions were 
subject to the ordinary four-year limitations period in the judicial code. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-12-25 (1953); Pete/er v. Robison, 17 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1932). "The 
legislature [then] exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining that the 
shortening of the statute of limitation (along with requiring notice of intention to 
sue), would insure the continued availability of adequate health care services." 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 1981). It deliberately 
reduced the time for which a patient could commence a malpractice action by two 
years and made clear an action was "not to exceed four years after the date" of the 
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alleged misconduct. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1). The Legislature recognized 
there were going to be instances where a plaintiff could commence an action after 
two years, but before the four-year repose period when it promulgated exceptions 
to the two-year limitations period. Under this reading, all provisions in the Act 
exist harmoniously. 
B. Reading the Fraudulent Concealment Exception to Toll the Repose 
Period Renders the Act of Repose Meaningless and With No Effect. 
To read the Act's exceptions as a toll on the four-year statute of repose 
would render it meaningless. The inclusion of the repose period where the statute 
already contains a statute of limitations can have no significance "other than to 
impose an outside limit." See Lamp!, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) overruled on other grounds by Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 
130 S. Ct. 1784 (2011). "By establishing a fixed limit, a statute of repose implements 
a 'legislative decisio[n] that as a matter of policy there should be a specific time 
beyond which a defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability."' 
California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2051 (2017) 
(alteration in original) (quoting CTS, 573 U.S. at 9). Indeed, the Legislature 
explicitly explained that the purpose of the Act was to "provide a reasonable time 
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in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting 
that time to a specific period." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(3). 
This may seem like a particularly harsh result. But "[n]ot every harsh result 
indicates a contradiction that must be 'reconciled' away." Scalia & Garner, supra, 
at 181. So, although the Utah Supreme Court has noted that a physician could 
hypothetically be rewarded for concealing their wrongful acts, Day v. Meek, 1999 
UT 28, 'l[ 18, 976 P.2d 1202, those risks must be considered given the purpose of a 
repose and the Act itself. The defendant "ought to be secure in his reasonable 
expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought 
not be called on to resist a claim when evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 
A.2d 662, 667-68 (NJ. 1972) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Indeed, "[o]ne of the chief purposes of the [Act] was to prevent the filing of 
unjustified lawsuits against health care providers, with all the attendant costs, 
economic and otherwise, that such suits entail." Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 
(Utah 1979). "Considering the function of a statute of limitations as a device for 
repose a potential defendant's equities are the same whether the plaintiff knows 
of his condition or not." Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142, 
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145 (N.Y. 1963). Accordingly, at some point the remote chance that a provider will 
affirmatively act to conceal his misconduct and actually prevent the patient from 
discovering their injury despite the patient's due diligence is substantially 
outweighed by the Legislature's express intent to prohibit the filing of stale 
malpractice claims. The Legislature has expressly indicated that the tipping point 
is four years. 
This is especially true in medical malpractice cases. Research and 
developments in medicine has led to major accomplishments as well as reversals 
of prior practices. These changes sometimes lead to changes in the very basic 
definition of what represents the standard of care. So, a physician's treatment with 
the most up-to-date training and skill in one year may be outdated within a few 
short years later. Physicians should not be subjected to stale claims based on 
standards distorted by hindsight. 
The Legislature certainly recognized this when they included a maximum 
cut-off date for filing claims in the Act, and expressly stated that the purpose of 
the Act was to "alleviat[] the adverse effects" such as health care providers 
"practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential 
adversary" and discouraging health care providers from "continuing to provide 
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services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice 
insurance." Id. § 78B-3-402. 
In sum, the Act has a two-year statute of limitations, a four-year repose 
period, and two broad exceptions. When read as a whole and given the context, 
the exceptions provide the circumstances in which a plaintiff may commence an 
action after the two-year limitations period but before the four-year repose period. 
To allow the exceptions to toll the statute of repose runs against the Legislature's 
express purpose to limit that time for which a health care provider may be liable. 
Id. § 78B-3-402(3). More importantly, the repose period-expressly limiting claims 
to four years-can serve no other purpose than to create an absolute cutoff. So, an 
interpretation of the Act which allows the exceptions in Subsection (2) to toll the 
repose period renders the repose meaningless. The language limiting claims to 
four years would be rendered superfluous. Any prospective defendant could 
never enjoy a repose and would be called to defend a lawsuit at any time as long 
as the plaintiff broadly alleges fraudulent concealment. This could not have been 
what the Legislature intended. 
Here, Appellees' claims are therefore facially time-barred because the 
allegedly negligent act, omission, or occurrence was well beyond the four-year 
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repose period. There can be no dispute the facts alleged in the Amended 
Complaints, if accepted as true, prove that both the statute of limitations and 
statute of repose have lapsed. (Bright 3-8, 67; Merlo 4-9, 70; Tapp 3-9, 82.) The Act 
provides that no action may be commenced after "four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1). In 
the Amended Complaints, Appellees allege that Appellants performed the 
unnecessary procedures and committed the alleged misconduct between 2007 and 
2009. (Bright 3-4, 85-87; Merlo 4-9, 87-92; Tapp 5-7, 126-132.) They also allege 
that Dr. Sorensen resigned-providing no further care-in 2012. (Bright 3-4; Merlo 
4-6; Tapp 3-7.) Appellees' actions were only commenced in 2017 or later. (Bright 
17, 67; Merlo 16, 70; Tapp 17, 82.) Therefore, by the facts expressly pleaded in the 
Amended Complaints, Appellees' actions are time-barred by the Act's repose 
period. 
II. APPELLEES' PLEADINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT, AND MUST BE 
DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even if this Court determines that the statute of repose may be tolled by 
Subsection (2)(b), the district courts erred by not requiring Appellees to make a 
prima facie showing as expressly required by the Act. Specifically, the courts made 
at least two major erroneous conclusions: Appellees' equitable tolling or 
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fraudulent concealment claim presents questions of fact that cannot be decided on 
a motion to dismiss and Appellees need not plead facts in anticipation of the 
statute of limitations defense. (Bright 374-390; Merlo 351-353; Tapp 734-35.) 
Essentially, the courts determined that, although Defendants successfully 
established that the applicable statute of limitations and repose had lapsed, 
Appellees had a right to litigate their claims because they baldly alleged fraud. To 
be clear, Appellees conclude Appellants engaged in fraudulent concealment, but 
all factual allegations merely reiterate the original tortious conduct and no 
subsequent action designed to conceal the cause of action. (Bright 82-102; Merlo 
96-115; Tapp 122-148.) This cannot be what the Legislature intended. Under this 
approach no motion to dismiss based on the lapse of a statutory limitations period 
would ever be successful. Young Res. Ltd. P'ship v. Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 
UT App 99, '[ 31, 427 P.3d 457. 
Because the statute of repose cannot be equitably tolled, on a motion to 
dismiss, the district court must look to the pleadings and assess whether Appellees 
have made sufficient allegations that if proved can support the requirements of 
the statutory exception. Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, '['[ 8-
9, 104 P.3d 1226. Requiring Appellees to allege the elements of the statutory 
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exception does not unfairly require them to anticipate a litany of possible 
affirmative defenses as the district courts suggest. Rather, it simply holds the 
plaintiff accountable for knowing the statute of limitations as required by Utah 
law. See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 'I[ 20, 108 P.3d 741 
(explaining that a plaintiff's ignorance of the statute of limitations is no excuse for 
filing an untimely claim). Nevertheless, Appellees asserted their fraudulent 
concealment and equitable tolling claims before Appellants even moved to dismiss 
showing that they already knew their complaints were time-barred. (Bright 17; 
Merlo 16; Tapp 17.) The courts even gave Appellees the opportunity to amend 
their complaints after Appellants moved to dismiss, and they allege additional 
facts in support of their claims for equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment. 
(Bright 82-102; Merlo 122-148; Tapp 96-115.) Therefore, like any cause of action 
alleged in a complaint, Plaintiff must allege facts that if proved could support their 
claim as a matter of law. 
The issues thus presented by Appellants are squarely within the province of 
a motion to dismiss-to determine the sufficiency of the pleadings. In sum, as 
established below, because their equitable and statutory tolling claim fails as a 
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matter of law because (A) statutes of repose cannot be equitably tolled and (B) the 
allegations, even if proven, cannot support the elements of the statutory exception. 
A. Appellees Can Only Toll the Statute of Repose by Pleading the 
Elements of Subsection (2) Because Statutes of Repose Cannot Be 
Equitably Tolled. 
"Once a statute has begun to run, a plaintiff must file his or her claim before 
the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. 
v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 'I[ 20, 108 P.3d 741. "Mere ignorance of the existence of a 
cause of action will neither prevent the running of the statute of limitations nor 
excuse a plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the relevant statutory period." Id. 
Accordingly, under Utah law, a plaintiff is charged with knowing and anticipating 
the statute of limitations or statute of repose when bringing an action. Sufficiently 
pleading the elements to satisfy an exception to that limitations or repose period 
should be no different. This is especially true where, as in this case, the plaintiff 
alleges that a repose period is tolled by the defendant's alleged fraud. (Bright 96-
100; Merlo 109-113; Tapp 142-146.) 
Only "two narrow settings [exist] in which a statute of limitations may be 
tolled until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. 'I[ 
21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule is commonly 
referred to as the "discovery rule." Id. In the first instance, the rule applies when 
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the relevant statute, by its own terms, mandates application of the discovery rule. 
Id. By contrast, in the second setting, the discovery rule applies when the court 
finds it equitable to toll the limitations period where exceptional circumstances 
exist. Id. 'l['l[ 24-25. But the Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
"equitable exceptions apply only where a statute of limitations does not, by its own 
terms, already account for such circumstances-i.e., where a statute of limitations 
lacks a statutory discovery rule." Id. 'l[ 25. Accordingly, equitable exceptions and 
considerations will not apply in this case because a statutory discovery rule exists. 
Under Utah law, statutes of repose cannot be equitably tolled. Jensen v. 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27, 'l[ 30 n. 5,424 P.3d 885; Craftsman Builder's 
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT18, 'l['l[ 24-27, 974 P.2d 1194 (concluding that 
statute of repose provisions are not subject to a discovery rule); Willis v. DeWitt, 
2015 UT App 123, 'l['l[ 8, 13,350 P.3d 250 ("[A] party's ignorance of the injury, which 
is generally a ground for equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, does not toll 
a statute of repose."); In re Estate of Strand, 2015 UT App 259, 'l['l[ 4-9, 362 P.3d 739 
( concluding that a statute of repose in the Probate Code is not subject to equitable 
tolling despite allegations of fraudulent concealment). The United States Supreme 
Court has similarly explained, "it is evident that the equitable tolling doctrine is 
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fundamentally inconsistent" with a statute of repose. Lamp!, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis 
& Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,363 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Merck 
& Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2011). Consequently, statutes of repose 
"generally may not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond 
a plaintiff's control." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014). 
In sum, because a statutory discovery rule exists in the Act, the equitable 
discovery rule does not apply in this case, and those equitable exceptions and 
principles should not be determinative. And the court need not weigh the facts 
developed through discovery and assess whether the statute of repose should be 
equitably tolled as the district court and Appellees suggest. Instead, whether the 
Act's repose period is tolled is a question of law that turns entirely on the plain 
language of Subsection (2)(b ). The court must assess the pleadings to determine 
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the elements of the express language 
of the Act's discovery rule. 
B. Appellees' Pleadings Cannot Survive a Motion to Dismiss. 
The plain language of Subsection (2)(b) makes clear that Appellees must 
allege certain information for the exception to apply. Specifically, the exception 
states: 
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(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1): 
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider 
because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (emphasis added). It expressly requires the 
plaintiff or patient to (1) allege that they have been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of the healthcare provider because that health care 
provider (2) has affirmatively acted to (3) fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct and (4) the claim has been commenced within one year of discovery 
through reasonable diligence. Id. 
1. Appellees Have The Burden to Allege Certain Facts in The 
Pleadings. 
Generally, when a complaint includes all information, including salient 
dates, a statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss. Tucker 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 'l[ 8, 53 P.3d 947. "[T]he inclusion of 
dates in the complaint indicating that the action is untimely renders it subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim." Id. (quoting SA Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 1990)). "This 
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particularly is true if the action sued on is statutory in origin, because the bar of 
the statute of limitations then is said to extinguish not only the remedy but the 
underlying substantive right as well." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice, and 
Procedure § 1357 at 345. 
As in this case, "when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the 
right sued upon has been extinguished, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
a factual basis for tolling the statute." Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., 627 F.2d 1036, 
1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980); Tracey v. Blood, 3 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah 1931) (" Apparently 
all courts are agreed, and in this case it is conceded that the burden was upon the 
plaintiff to plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations."); 
Young Res. Ltd. P'ship v. Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 'I[ 31, 427 P.3d 
457 ("[W]hen the face of the complaint would otherwise establish that the claims 
are time-barred, a plaintiff presumably bears some burden to invoke the discovery 
rule."); 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitations of Actions§ 155 (explaining that "the burden for 
such relief rests on the party seeking it"). Even under the fraudulent concealment 
version of the discovery rule, Utah law holds "that a plaintiff must make a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 
1996) (leaving "as the law the general rule that a plaintiff must make a prima facie 
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showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered his or her 
claim earlier"); accord Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, 'II 23, 223 P.3d 1128 
(explaining that "the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know 
nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time 
to reasonably comply with the limitations period"). "If a plaintiff had no such 
burden, 'a statute of limitations defense that is subject to the discovery rule could 
never be successfully asserted in a motion to dismiss, and that is clearly not the 
rule."' Young Res., 2018 UT App 99, 'I[ 31 ( quoting Butler v. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 
Inc., 2006-NMCA-084, 'I[ 33, 140 P.3d 532). 
More important, the plain language of Subsection (2)(b) expressly requires 
the plaintiffs to "allege" certain information. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b) 
(stating "(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct"). Allegations are made in the pleadings, i.e. the 
complaint. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a). It is the plaintiff's "duty to plead a matter in order 
for that matter to be heard in the lawsuit." Burden of Allegation, Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). To be considered in the lawsuit, Appellees must make 
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sufficient allegations in the Amended Complaint to show that the exception tolls 
the relevant limitations period. 
In any event, whether the plaintiffs should be expected to anticipate Dr. 
Sorensen's statute of limitations affirmative defense is moot. Appellees alleged 
claims for fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling in their original 
complaint. (Bright 12-17; Merlo 11-16; Tapp 13-17.) In effect, they opened the door 
to the sufficiency of the pleadings. So, contrary to the district court's 
determinations, Appellees are not being asked to anticipate some unknown 
affirmative defense. (Bright 374-390; Merlo 400-405; Tapp 732-739.) Appellees 
were even afforded the opportunity to amend their complaints to allege more facts 
after Appellants moved to dismiss. Allowing them to allege these claims without 
requiring them to support them with allegations as required by Rules 8 and 9 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is unjust. It would be the equivalent of allowing 
Appellees to amend the complaint to remove the salient dates that show the 
complaint is time-barred to avoid a motion to dismiss. It would be unfair and defy 
the purpose of procedural rules. 
Even if a court liberally construes the allegations made in the Amended 
Complaints, Appellees' allegations do not sufficiently support the elements of the 
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Act's exception. They are mere legal conclusions and opinions couched as fact. 
Moreover, Appellees fail to allege the required elements of Subsection (2)(b ). For 
instance, they have failed to make any allegation that shows Appellants 
affirmatively acted to conceal the original misconduct. Instead, Appellees assert 
that Appellants' original misconduct was misleading and that is why they never 
discovered their injury. (Bright 85-87, 96-100; Merlo 98-101, 109-113; Tapp 126-
132, 142-146.) As demonstrated below, this is insufficient to satisfy Appellees' 
burden. 
2. Appellees Fail to Allege Any Affirmative Act to Conceal the 
Original Misconduct. 
The Act requires the plaintiff to allege that the health care provider 
"affirmatively acted" to conceal the alleged misconduct. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
404(2)(b ). This requires an allegation that the provider "'took affirmative steps to 
conceal the plaintiff's cause of action."' See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 2004 UT App 290, 
'I[ 20, 99 P.3d 348 (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 n.2 (Utah 1996) 
(applying the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule)). Fraudulent 
concealment of the alleged misconduct cannot be supported by a mere allegation 
of the original tortious behavior. See Plain v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 115 A.D.3d 922, 
923-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (" A plaintiff must allege a later fraudulent 
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misrepresentation made for the purpose of concealing the former tort." (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, it requires an allegation of some 
fraudulent act to conceal the original misconduct. Id. In other words, "[i]t is not 
sufficient to show mere misconduct, but the plaintiff must be able to show that the 
defendant said or did something to lull or induce the plaintiff to delay the filing of 
his claim after the limitations period has run." Foster v. Plaut, 625 N.E.2d 198, 203 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
More importantly, an alleged concealment that is "nothing but defendants' 
failure to disclose the wrongs they had committed," is insufficient. Plain, 115 
A.D.2d at 923-24 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in 
Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that a 
doctor's failure to inform a patient of his alleged misconduct did not prevent the 
patient from discovering his cause of action. Id. *4. There, the plaintiff alleged that 
a doctor removed the wrong section of his colon and that he had to have a second 
surgery to remove the cancerous section of his colon. Id. *2. It was clear from the 
pleadings that the plaintiff was aware of the legal injury in May 2006. Id. Although 
he knew of his injury, he was unaware of the identity of the wrongdoer. Id. Still, 
the plaintiff waited until 2008-three months after the statute of limitations had 
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expired-to file his complaint. Id. The district court correctly dismissed the 
complaint on the pleadings. Id. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the limitations period was tolled, 
alleging fraudulent concealment. Id. Essentially, the plaintiff alleged that the 
doctor "concealed the fact that he failed to properly consult with [the general 
surgeon] in May 2004" which led him to take the wrong portion of plaintiff's colon. 
Id. *3. The plaintiff argued that the doctor's "failure to speak" fraudulently 
concealed the underlying misconduct. Id. But the appellate court disagreed, stating 
that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege that [the doctor] 'affirmatively acted to 
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct."' Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-
3-404(2)(b )(2008) ). It explained that the plaintiff failed to make any allegations that 
showed that the doctor's actions precluded him from discovery the injury. Id. 
"Without such factual allegations," according to the court, "[the plaintiff's] 
fraudulent concealment claim is nothing more than a mere conclusory allegation 
that is insufficient to preclude dismissal." Id. 
In another example, in Adams v. Richardson, 714 P.2d 921 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1986), the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that in "order for fraudulent 
concealment to occur, the defendant, in essence, must commit not one, but two 
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wrongs: the original [tortious] act and the subsequent fraudulent concealment of 
the same." Id. at 925. In that case, a husband and wife sued the wife's doctor for 
negligently prescribing and administering excessive radiation therapy for her lung 
cancer. Id. at 922. The couple filed their claim under Colorado's medical 
malpractice statute which contained a three-year repose period. Id. at 923. In their 
complaint, the couple alleged that she was treated by the doctor in 1978 and 
developed health issues in 1979 that were caused by the earlier treatment. Id. She 
was treated for these health issues until 1981-five months prior to the expiration 
of the repose period. Id. But the couple only filed their action in May 1982-about 
three years after the final radiation had been administered. Id. 
Like Utah's Malpractice statute; the plain language of the Colorado medical 
malpractice statute provides two exceptions to the three-year repose period: where 
the act or omission was knowingly concealed or where it consisted of leaving a 
foreign object in the claimant's body. Id.; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-80-
102.5(1), (3). It was generally undisputed that the physician had not provided the 
wife treatment after 1978 and the district court found no evidence of concealment. 
Id. at 925. On appellate review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the couple's complaint as time-barred, holding that fraudulent 
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concealment "occurs when a plaintiff suspects or discovers that a wrong has been 
committed and is subsequently misled or misadvised by the doctor concerning 
what was done or its effect." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, because the 
couple failed to allege any subsequent act designed to mislead or conceal the 
original misconduct, the factual assertion were insufficient "to bring [the couple's] 
case within the exception to the repose provision." Id. at 926. 
The same conclusion can be made here. The alleged facts to support 
Appellees' fraudulent concealment claims are exactly the same as those alleged to 
support their misrepresentation and negligence claims-there is no distinction. 
(Bright 82-102; Merlo 96-115; Tapp 122-148.) Appellees cannot rely on Dr. 
Sorensen's alleged misrepresentations or omissions about the closure procedures 
because these occurred before the procedure. (Bright 85-92, Merlo 98-105, 109-
113; Tapp 126-138, 142-46.) The alleged misconduct had not even occurred yet. A 
review of the allegations show that Appellees claim Dr. Sorensen misrepresented 
information about the procedure to induce her into having the procedure, not that 
he made misrepresentation to conceal an alleged misconduct after the procedure. 
Nothing prevented Appellees from obtaining a second opinion before having the 
closure procedure. 
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There is an important distinction between Dr. Sorensen's failing to tell 
Appellees that he performed an unnecessary surgery or engaged in malpractice 
and Dr. Sorensen subsequently lying or refusing to answer questions truthfully in 
an attempt to conceal the misconduct. Fraudulent concealment must go beyond a 
mere failure to tell Appellees that they committed malpractice. Adams, 714 P.2d at 
925-26; Plain, 115 A.D.2d at 923-24. To determine otherwise would render the 
discovery rule and the statutory exception meaningless-no health care provider 
is going to voluntarily inform the patient that they committed some action or 
omission that would amount to malpractice. This is especially true where nothing 
even infers that the patients have asked whether the procedure was absolutely 
necessary as opposed to elective. Essentially, under Appellees' interpretation, 
every time a healthcare provider allegedly commits malpractice, the patient can 
claim that the failure to inform them of the malpractice was an act to fraudulently 
conceal the cause of action. This cannot be · what the Legislature intended, 
especially considering the important role of statutes of repose and the severe 
nature of fraud allegations. 
To say that in every case where the medical provider failed to inform the 
patient of their alleged misconduct and the plaintiff was unaware of the alleged 
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wrong a fact question exists as to fraudulent concealment, is to do damage to the 
Legislature's expression of public policy as embodied in the four-year repose 
period. There must be something more than a mere continuation of a prior 
nondisclosure. There must be an allegation that, if proved, can create a fact 
question as to some positive act of fraud or something so furtively planned and 
secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed. 
3. Appellees Fail to Allege Fraud with Any Particularity as 
Required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Act expressly requires the plaintiff to allege that the health care 
provider acted to "fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-4-404(2) (emphasis added). It makes clear that the plaintiff must allege some 
act of fraud designed to conceal the original misconduct or tort. Id. Accordingly, 
Appellees' allegations must meet the heightened level of particularity of all fraud 
claims. Precision Vascular Sys., Inc. v. Sarcos, L.C., 199 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1191 (D. Utah 
2002) (explaining that fraudulent concealment causes of action require that a 
complaint plead material misrepresentation and scienter with particularity); Roth 
v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, *4 (affirming the dismissal with prejudice, in part, 
because the plaintiff failed to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity as 
required by rule 9). 
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Under Utah law, a fraud claim must be pleaded with a heightened level of 
particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c). "In alleging fraud ... , a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Id. "[M]ere 
conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant 
surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment." 
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989); see also Armed 
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 'l[ 16, 50 P.3d 35 (stressing that mere 
conclusory allegations are insufficient to preclude summary disposition). 
Moreover, "a mere naked falsehood or misrepresentation is not enough" to 
properly plead a fraud claim. Christensen v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 579 
P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1978) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, 
the plaintiff must allege fraudulent concealment with sufficient details and 
supporting facts to establish that the health care provider's actions were intended 
to conceal. 
For instance, in Chafin v. Wisconsin Province of Society of Jesus, 917 N.W.2d 
821, (Neb. 2018), the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a 
plaintiff's complaint for failing to sufficiently plead her fraudulent concealment 
argument. Id. at 825. The Court explained, "In order to survive a motion to dismiss, 
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a complaint alleging fraudulent concealment must plead with particularity how 
material facts were concealed to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the 
misconduct and how, through diligence, the plaintiff failed to discover his or her 
injury." Id. 
This heightened duty makes sense because of the severe nature of fraud 
allegations. Charging someone with fraud or with acting fraudulently will no 
doubt damage the defendant's reputation and raise implications of moral 
turpitude. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, 'I[ 11,344 P.3d 
156.3 This is especially true where, as in this case, the defendant is a professional 
in the community that relies on the public's trust. Patients look to their healthcare 
3. "A number of reasons have been advanced to justify the more stringent pleading 
requirement." Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, 'I[ 11, 344 
P.3d 156. 
Commentators have explained that rules analogous to our rule [9(c)] 
exist to discourage lightly made claims charging the commission of 
acts that involve some degree of moral turpitude. Others have 
suggested that the rule stems from the common law's historical 
reluctance to reopen transactions. The rule also serves to deter filing 
exploratory suits with little information in the hopes that discovery 
will uncover information to support the allegations. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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providers to be honest and qualified to give them quality treatment. And any 
suggestion that the healthcare provider acted fraudulently to hide an initial 
misconduct is even more detrimental to their reputation. The public can be 
forgiving of the provider's mistake or misconduct but will seek to punish the 
provider for any subsequent fraud. 
Additionally, the heightened pleading requirement "is designed, not only 
to put defendants on notice of alleged misconduct, but also to prevent fishing 
expeditions." Id. 'I[ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Not only 
will a defendant know precisely what conduct the plaintiff believes constitutes a 
fraud and be able to prepare accordingly, but the pleading requirement will also 
avoid the embarrassment, prejudice and expense that comes with having to 
defend against a baseless and invasive fishing expedition. This is only fair 
considering the grave consequences of such claims. Thus, a plaintiff should not be 
allowed to move forward with an allegation of fraud without meeting the 
heightened requirements of Rule 9. 
Here, Appellees have failed to make any allegations that would meet the 
heightened particularity requirement of Rule 9. Actually, the allegations in the 
Amended Complaints are the exact averments that the rule serves to prohibit. 
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Even if liberally construed, Appellees merely regurgitate the conclusory language 
of the fraudulent concealment exception. They broadly assert opinions and legal 
conclusions couched as fact. Nothing about Appellees' allegations reveals how Dr. 
Sorensen's actions fraudulently concealed their causes of action. 
Indeed, the only allegations with any amount of detail or surrounding fact 
are merely reiterations of the alleged malpractice, not subsequent fraud intended 
to conceal. Specifically, Appellees allege that Dr. Sorensen failed to disclose that 
the procedures were not medically necessary and that "had Plaintiff known that 
her closure was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery." 
(Bright 92; Merlo 109; Tapp 142.) Thus, by their own account, the alleged fraud 
occurred before the procedure or was intended to induce the patient to undergo 
the procedure. 
There are a dozen reasons Dr. Sorensen may not have disclosed that the 
procedure was elective after it was performed. For instance, he may have assumed 
the patient knew it was elective or he could have believed that information was 
clear from other information given to each plaintiff. (Bright 91; Merlo 104; Tapp 
135-36 (alleging that the information provided indicated that the procedure was 
"an aggressive" and "preventative strategy").) Dr. Sorensen may have even 
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believed that he had already informed the patient that the procedure was elective 
or preventative. Indeed, Appellees acknowledge they were given informed 
consent documents. (Bright 96-97; Merlo 109-110; Tapp 142-145.) This is even 
more likely considering there is no allegation that the patients even asked whether 
the procedure was medically necessary. Each of those possible explanations are 
mere mistakes or inadvertent errors, not fraud. Accordingly, a mere failure to 
disclose does not amount to fraud without additional allegations with supporting 
facts that could show that Dr. Sorensen intended to conceal the necessity of the 
procedure to prevent Appellees from discovering their injuries. Therefore, without 
sufficient allegations, Appellees should not be allowed to circumvent the clear 
language of the statute and engage in an invasive fishing expedition. 
4. Appellees Fail to Allege Any Facts that Show Any Amount of 
Diligence to Discover Their Causes of Action. 
The Act makes clear that the plaintiff or patient must have acted diligently 
to discover the injury and fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1), (2)(b). "[B]efore 
a plaintiff may rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine, he must have actually 
made an attempt to investigate his claim and that such an attempt must have been 
rendered futile as a result of the defendant's fraudulent or misleading conduct." 
See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, 'l[ 40, 156 P.3d 
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806 (applying the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule); see also 
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 'l[ 26, 108 P.3d 741) (emphasizing 
that plaintiff should use due diligence to discover facts supporting the cause of 
action "despite the defendant's efforts to conceal it"). Thus, to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that can "prove that his or her failure to 
meet a requirement in filing his or her pleading is not attributable to a larger failure 
to act diligently in pursuing his or her judicial remedies during the statutory 
period." See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 155 (discussing the fraudulent 
concealment version of the discovery rule); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
404(2)(b). 
"Indeed, if a plaintiff has made no inquiry, there can generally be no factual 
basis on which to conclude that an inquiry would have been futile." Colosimo, 2007 
UT 25, 'l[ 43; Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996) (expressly refusing "to 
excuse the diligence requirement [even] when ... successful concealment would 
fool even the most diligent hypothetical plaintiff"). "' A party who has opportunity 
of knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and 
afterwards allege a want of knowledge."' Id. 'l[ 40 ( quoting Baldwin v. Burton, 850 
P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993)). Accordingly, the plaintiff "cannot idly wait for a 
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claim to present itself; rather, a plaintiff must act with reasonable diligence to 
discover the facts constituting his or her cause of action." Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). "[A] defendant's mere silence in the face of a plaintiff's 
failure to use reasonable diligence in investigating a claim is insufficient evidence 
of fraudulent concealment to warrant tolling the statute of limitations." Id. 'l[ 44 
(noting that "[ o ]ther jurisdictions have similarly held that Appellees with 
knowledge of underlying facts must reasonably investigate their claims in order 
to rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine").4 Therefore, without factual 
4. See, e.g., Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 170 v. NLRB, 993 F.2d 990, 998 
(1st Cir. 1993) ("Irrespective of the extent of effort to conceal, the fraudulent 
concealment doctrine will not save a charging party who fails to exercise due 
diligence, and is thus charged with notice of a potential claim."); Evans v. Rudy-
Luther Toyota, Inc., 39 F. Supp.2d 1177, 1185 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that the 
plaintiff failed to plead facts that could show she exercised due diligence); Cevenini 
v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 770 (D.C. 1998) (refusing to toll the 
statute of limitations, reasoning that it was "unwilling to hold that a failure to 
disclose information that has not even been requested constitutes fraudulent 
concealment"). 
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allegations that, if proven, could show that the plaintiff at least attempted to 
discover the alleged misconduct, the plaintiff cannot meet his burden. 
This concept is not new. In Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879), the United 
States Supreme Court explained that, "the plaintiff is held to stringent rules of 
pleading and evidence, and especially must there be distinct averments as to the 
time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or misrepresentation was discovered, 
and what the discovery is, so that the court may clearly see whether, by ordinary 
diligence, the discovery might not have been before made." Id. at 140 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). It emphasized, "A general allegation of 
ignorance at one time and of knowledge at another are of no effect." Id. "If the 
plaintiff made any particular discovery, it should be stated when it was made, 
what it was, how it was made, and why it was not made sooner." Id. at 141. The 
Court thus concluded, "A party seeking to avoid the bar of the statute on account 
of fraud must aver and show that he used due diligence to detect it, and if he had 
the means of discovery in his power, he will be held to have known it." Id. 
For example, in Pelullo v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 131 Fed. 
Appx. 864 (3rd Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's decision to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the 
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plaintiffs failed to plead facts to support an inference that their ignorance of their 
claims was not attributable to their own lack of due diligence. Id. at 866. There, 
plaintiffs brought a civil racketeering action against an insurance company and 
several attorneys, asserting the attorneys committed malpractice in connection 
with their representation of the plaintiffs. Id. It was clear the complaints were filed 
after the four-year statute of limitations, but the plaintiffs alleged the defendants 
"fraudulently concealed their activity" comprising their conspiracy and therefore 
the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. Id. The district court 
disagreed, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. Specifically, the Circuit Court 
explained that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs knew or 
should have known of his injury, and as such the plaintiffs must allege facts to 
show that their ignorance was not attributable to their own lack of reasonable due 
diligence. Id. It stated, 
Even assuming as the District Court did, that the [defendants] 
actively misled Plaintiffs, ... Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts 
which support an inference that such active misleading prevented 
them from recognizing the validity of their claims within the four-
year statutory period or that the Plaintiffs' ignorance was not 
attributable to their own lack of reasonable due diligence. 
Id. It therefore concluded, "[w]hile our standard of review requires us to accept as 
true all factual allegations in the complaint, we need not accept as true 
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unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." Id. ( citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Even assuming all inferences in favor of Appellees, they have done nothing 
to discover the alleged misconduct or the alleged fraud within the repose period. 
In fact, by their own account, Appellees did not investigate or even consider the 
issue until an advertisement prompted them to. (Bright 138; Merlo-Schmucker 112; 
Tapp 145.) Appellees did exactly what Utah case law cautions against-they have 
idly waited for a claim to present itself (quite literally) on the television or the 
attorneys' advertisements. Colosimo, 2007 UT 25, 'l[ 40; Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1196. 
No allegations have even been made to show that Appellees made any inquiries 
whatsoever as to the necessity of the closure procedure. They simply claim that 
they were blamelessly ignorant. 
More importantly, Appellees' failure to allege how they discovered the 
alleged fraud prevents them from meeting their burden to show that their actions 
were commenced within one year from the discovery of the alleged fraud. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404(2)(b ). Appellants moved the court to dismiss the Amended 
Complaints, alleging that the actions were not timely. Undisputedly, the actions 
were raised outside the Act's repose period, and the only possible way around the 
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cutoff is to show that their actions were commenced within one year of Appellees' 
discovery of the purported fraud. Accordingly, Appellees cannot even meet their 
burden to show that the Amended Complaints were commenced within the time 
limit prescribed by subsection (2)(b ). 
In sum, Appellees do not even suggest that they exercised due diligence in 
seeking out the information that they claim was wrongfully concealed. They 
merely assert that they were ignorant of the cause of action and the facts 
underlying their causes of action because Dr. Sorensen did not come right out and 
tell them he committed malpractice. (Bright 96-100; Merlo 109-113; Tapp 142-46.) 
"A general allegation of ignorance at one time and of knowledge at another are of 
no effect." Wood, 101 U.S. at 140. Accordingly, Appellees cannot survive a motion 
to dismiss because even if this Court were to assume the veracity of their 
allegations, nothing shows that they made any inquiry into whether they had a 
cause of action or why they may have been prevented from discovering the alleged 
misconduct. Pelullo, 131 Fed. Appx. at 866. Similarly, nothing shows that the 
actions were commenced within one year of discovering the alleged fraud or when 
a reasonable person should have discovered the alleged fraud. Therefore, 
Appellees' pleadings are insufficient and should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is not a case in which Appellees are being asked to anticipate some 
arbitrary affirmative defense. They alleged tolling and fraudulent concealment in 
the first instance and now expect to survive a motion to dismiss with nothing more 
than broad opinions and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. The 
Legislature enacted the Act for the specific purpose to create a time limit on health 
care malpractice actions. It even reduced the statute of limitations by two years 
and expressly indicated that no claim may be commenced after four years. To give 
meaning to the Act and effect to the Legislature's intentions, this court must read 
the Act's repose period as an absolute bar of Appellees claims. But, even if this 
court determines that the repose period may be tolled by the exceptions in 
Subsection (2), it is clear the Amended Complaints fail as a matter of law. 
Appellees' opinions and legal conclusions do not satisfy the requirements of the 
Act and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In other words, the sufficiency of the 
pleadings preclude Appellees' claims. In particular, Appellees failed to plead facts 
that could demonstrate Dr. Sorensen affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged injury or that they attempted to discover their causes of action but were 
inevitably prevented because of Dr. Sorensen's fraudulent concealment. 
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788-3-402 Legislative findings and declarations -- Purpose of act. 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the 
amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent 
years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost 
of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased 
claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost 
of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because 
he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers 
are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible 
unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which 
these trends are producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the 
public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to 
continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from 
private companies. 
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific 
period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement 
of claims. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Page 1 
Utah Code 
788-3-404 Statute of limitations -- Exceptions -- Application. 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ): 
(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has 
been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; or 
(b) in an action where ii is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct 
on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted 
to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Tier 3 Filing) 
(Jury Demanded) 
Civil No. 170906790 
Judge: Laura Scott 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Johannah Bright is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL. (St. Mark's) is a for-profit corporation based 
in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark's Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108 
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude, joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Plaintiff. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102. 
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 




I 0. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septa! defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septa! tissue to form between the atria, PFOs can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovate fails to close. 1 
I I. Life threatening ASD's are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's almost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovate is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff. 
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13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
15. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
16. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark's and at other hospitals. From 
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, 
many of those at St. Mark's. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest 
of the country by a factor often-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier. 
17. The administration at St. Mark's was on notice because of the sheer volume of the 
procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners 
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing 
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unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark's ignored obvious warnings to 
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income. 
18. Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark's, Sorensen advised 
St. Mark's representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a 
result, St. Mark's was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that 
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
19. Further, Sorensen's cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or 
about June 27, 2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed 
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health 
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki 
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen's suspension. 
20. Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed. For instance, Sorensen often 
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of 
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The 
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always 
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures. 
21. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
T!As, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff. 
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22. Despite the fact that St. Mark's knew that Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically 
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark's Hospital continued to court Sorensen's 
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and 
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain. 
23. In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark's became financially 
dependent on Sorensen's incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark's cardiac 
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St. 
Mark's. As a result, St. Mark's provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling 
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St. 
Mark's also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and 
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel 
that were willing to share in the largesse. 
24. Ultimately, St. Mark's made a deliberate an_d conscious decision not to inform 
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse 
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed 
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark's kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
25. On 9-21-07, Ms. Bright was seen in referral by Sorensen for migraine headaches 
and a transesophageal echocardiogram reported to show right to left shunting across the atrial 
septum. On 9-21-07, in Dr. Sorensen's office, Ms. Bright underwent a transthoracic 
echocardiogram (TTE) with bubble study and a transcranial doppler study (TCD). The 
echocardiogram was interpreted to show "severe rest and valsalva shunt by bubble study." The 
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TCD was interpreted to show conductance grade of 4/5 at rest and 5/5 with calibrated respiratory 
strain. Dr. Sorensen noted that the patient has described "minor palpitations." 
26. On 10-1-07, a brain MRI is performed at Western Neurological Associates. It was 
interpreted as "normal contrast-enhanced MRI of the brain." 
27. On 11-28-07, Ms. Bright was seen in office follow-up by Dr. Sorensen. He did not 
recommend closure of her septa! defect: "The options for closure for stroke prevention [were] 
reviewed but she [did] not have risk stratification features other than migraine." Dr. Sorensen 
asked Ms. Bright to consider enrolling in a randomized trial called the PREMIUM trial. That 
never occurred. 
28. On 11-4-09, a repeat consult was performed by Dr. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen's 
neurologic exam on Ms. Bright was not comprehensive. For instance, it did not include a sensory 
exam. In the impression section of this history and physical, Dr. Sorensen dictated: "This woman 
has high risk features for stroke which include the presence of progressive migraine, moderately 
severe persistent shunting, severe Valsalva shunting, and an interatrial septa! aneurysm." This note 
was contrary to his previous note of 11-28-07 in which he dictated: "but she does not have risk 
stratification features other than migraine." 
29. On 12-15-09, Dr. Sorensen performed an intracardiac echo-guided septa! defect 
closure. He deployed a 20 mm Gore HELEX device. 
30. On 3-18-10, Ms. Bright underwent a TTE and a TCD in Dr. Sorensen's office. Both 
studies demonstrated the presence of a residual shunt. A bubble study during the echocardiogram 
showed "mild right to left shunt at rest" and moderate right to left shunt" after valsalva. The TCD 
is interpreted to show a conductance grade of 2/5 at rest and 4/5 during calibrated respiratory 
strain. Dr. Sorensen's TCD reports gave slightly different guidelines for a "diagnostic TCD" 
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versus a "post-device TCD." In the diagnostic TCD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild 
to moderate" shunt with moderate probability for PFO, ASD, or A VM. There was a "low risk for 
stroke." In the post device TCD, a conductance grade of 4/5 is termed a "mild residual shunt." A 
conductance grade of 5 or 5+/5 in a post device TCD is termed a "significant residual shunt" and 
"further evaluation is indicated." 
31. On or about June 28, 2010, Ms. Bright had a 6 month followTTE and TCD. These 
studies were interpreted to show a decrease in the magnitude of the residual shunt. The 
echocardiogram was interpreted to show no right to left shunt at rest and a mild right to left shunt 
with valsalva. The TCD was interpreted to show J /5 conductance grade at rest and 3/5 
conductance grade with calibrated respiratory strain. The guidelines included in the TCD report 
indicates that a 3/5 conductance grade means "no significant shunt." 
32. The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septa! defect include right 
ventricular chamber enlargement, orthodeoxia-platypnea, and paradoxical embolism. Ms. Bright 
did not have the first two. And, Dr. Sorensen failed to perform the appropriate assessment as to 
the last. 
33. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Bright. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of 
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain, imaging of the extra cranial and intracranial 
cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging 
of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV 
of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup. Here, Dr. Sorensen did not 
meet this standard of care by, among other things, failing to give the details of alleged trans 
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ischemic attacks that Sorensen (not a neurologist) diagnosed, failing to get a neurology 
consultation, failing to have neuro-cognitive testing performed to document "cognitive decline," 
and failing to repeat a brain MRI to look for objective evidence of stroke. In short, Sorensen did 
not perform the required comprehensive evaluation. 
34. To persuade Ms. Bright to undergo closure, Sorensen represented to her that she 
was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ ASD and that closure was 
medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history 
of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a 
Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Ms. Bright. Sorensen's patient 
literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright 
falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)" 
• "Strokes resulting from septa! defects have a 503/o mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." 
• "Stroke reduction to less than I%" 
• "Septa] Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" 
• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" 
In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Ms. Bright both orally and 
in writing. These misrepresentations include: 
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• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy of Neurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients. outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing. 
• Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by I CAEL (lntersocietal 
Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on his 
echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by ICAEL and this was false. 
These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Ms. Bright to undergo closure at St. 
Mark's by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted 
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure. 
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35. Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, 
it did nothing to notify Ms. Bright. Instead, St. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen's practice to 
continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients 
like Ms. Bright. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about 
Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the 
public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary surgeries. 
36. Ms. Bright could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was 
false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's, as her health care providers, 
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual 
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates 
the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
37. Because of Defendants' fraudulent statements and omissions, Ms. Bright was until 
recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Ms. Bright only learned of the Defendants' 
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and 
filing of this action within the statutory period. 
38. Because of Defendants' conduct, Ms. Bright suffered significant damages, 
including: 
1. undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, 
11. paying significant medical expenses to Defendants, 
iii. physical pain, and 
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating 
or even deadly stroke. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE) 
39. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
40. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
41. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required. 
42. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
43. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
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candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and 
44. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional 
anguish. 
45. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
46. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
4 7. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
48. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
49. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
50. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
51. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be determined at trial. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
52. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
53. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
54. Defendants' representations that Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
55. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiff's medical care was true. 
56. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
57. Defendants had a financial interest m performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
58. Plaintiff relied on Defendants j representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
59. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 
60. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
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61. Defendant St. Mark's owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the 
selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to 
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
62. Defendant St. Mark's breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection 
of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and 
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
63. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark's 
caused harm to Plaintiff. 
64. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
65. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
66. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiffs medical care, to Plaintiff. 
67. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
68. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
69. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
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70. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
71. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
72. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
73. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiffs medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
74. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiffs medical care. 
75. Defendants made these false statements .and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
76. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 
77. Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made 
by Defendants. 
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78. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
79. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
80. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
81. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark's to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, 
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. 
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of 
medical procedures to Plaintiff. 
82. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, 
-ai•d Defendant St. Mark's in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
83. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant 
St. Mark's, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators 
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
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84. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
85. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
86. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
87. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiff's cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
88. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary 
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
89. Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark's, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made 
a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may 
have had medically unnecessary closures. 
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90. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery 
sought by Plaintiff. 
9 I. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability recently. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
92. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls 
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b ). 
93. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. · For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to th.e extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of December 2017. 
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RULING AND ORDER RE PENDING 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
vs. 
SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; SORENSEN 
CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP; AND ST 
MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 170906790 
June 20, 2018 
Judge Laura S. Scott 
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by 
Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group (collectively Sorensen 
Defendants) and the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Defendant St. Mark's 
Hospital. The court heard oral argument on the Motions on May I, 2018 and took them under 
advisement. Having considered the briefing, arguments of counsel, and applicable law, the court 
now issues the following Ruling and Order: 
ALLEGATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1. This case involves surgery to close a patent foramen ovale (PFO), which is a hole 
in the heart that occurs after birth when the foramen ovale fails to close. 1 According to the First 
Amended Complaint, approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never 
require any treatment or evaluation. PFO closure is not medically necessary unless there is a 
confirmed diagnosis of recurrent cryptogenic stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA). 2 
1 The second type of hole is called an atrial septa! defect (ASD), which is considered a birth defect. 
' See First Amended Complaint, ,r,r 10-14, which was filed on December 21, 2017. 
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2. Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist who was practicing interventional cardiology. Dr. 
Sorensen had privileges at St. Mark's.3 
3. From approximately 2002 to 2012, Dr. Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO 
and ASD closures, many of those at St. Mark's. He performed these procedures at a rate that 
dwarfed the rest of the country.4 
4. St. Mark's was on notice that Dr. Sorensen was engaged in the practice of 
regularly performing unnecessary and invasive PFO closures on his patients because of the sheer 
volume of the procedures and complaints from other practitioners and employees. 5 
5. Also, during the hiring and credentialing process, Dr. Sorensen told St. Mark's 
how and under what conditions he would perform PFO and ASD closures, including that he 
would perform closures on patients who did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 6 
6. The catheterization lab at St. Mark's became financially dependent on Dr. 
Sorensen's practice. Consequently, despite knowing that Dr. Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, St. Mark's continued to court his business, provide a platform and 
assistance to him, and advertise and promote Dr. Sorensen's practice. 7 
7. The Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's created false statements and documents 
to conceal the fact that Dr. Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures, including 
medical charts. 8 
3 Id., ,r 16. 
'Id. 
5 Id., ,r 17. 
6 Id., ,r 18. 
7 Id., ,r,r 22, 23. 
8 Id., ,r 20. 
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8. In 2007, Plaintiff Johannah Bright was referred to Dr. Sorensen because she was 
experiencing migraines and a transesophageal echocardiogram showed right to left shunting 
across the atrial septum. She was seen by Dr. Sorensen on September 21, 2007 at his offices, 
where she underwent a transthoracic echocardiogram (TIE} with bubble study and transcranial 
Doppler study (TCD).9 
9. On October 1, 2007, Western Neurological Associates performed a brain MRI on 
Ms. Bright, which was interpreted as "normal contrast-enhanced MRI of the brain."10 
10. On November 28, 2007 at a follow-up office visit, r,r. Sorensen did not 
recommend closure because "she [ did] not have risk stratification features [ for stroke] other than 
migraine. 11 
11. On November 4, 2009, Ms. Bright returned to Dr. Sorensen for a second 
consultation. Dr. Sorensen's neurologic exam was not comprehensive. Contrary to his 2007 note, 
Dr. Sorensen's 2009 note states that Ms. Bright "has high risk features for stroke" and "an 
interatrial septa! aneurysm. "12 
12. To induce her to undergo the PFO closure procedure, Dr. Sorensen told Ms. 
Bright that she had a high risk of a debilitating stroke and that the PFO closure would be 
effective and was medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. Dr. Sorensen also provided 
Ms. Bright with a PFO handout that contained fraudulent statements and unsupported data. 13 
9 ld,1[25. 
10 Id., 1[26. 
11 ld,1[27. 
12 Id, ,r 28. 
13 Id, ,r 34. 
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13. Dr. Sorensen's statements were made with the intent to induce Ms. Bright to 
undergo the unnecessary procedure. Ms. Bright did not know the statements were false or 
misleading. And she relied on these statements in agreeing to undergo the procedure. 14 
14. On December 15, 2009, Ms. Bright underwent the PFO closure procedure.15 
15. On March 18, 2010 and June 28, 2018, Ms. Bright had follow-up tests in Dr. 
Sorensen's office. 16 
16. On or about June 27, 2011, Dr. Sorensen's privileges at another hospital were 
suspended. St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki Gledhill were aware of 
the suspension. 17 
17. St. Mark's knew about Dr. Sorensen's practices but did not inform Ms. Bright that 
she may have had a medically unnecessary surgery and chose not to reimburse her or her 
insurance company for the procedure. To this day, St. Mark's has actively concealed its 
knowledge about Dr. Sorensen's practices from patients, third party payors, and the public. 18 
18. Because of their fraudulent statements and omissions, Ms. Bright only learned of 
Defendants' misconduct as a result oflawyer advertising. 19 
19. Ms. Bright has suffered significant damages, including undergoing an 
unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, paying significant medical expenses, physical 
. d . al . h 20 pam, an emot10n angu1s . 
14 Id., 134. 
15 Id., 129. 
16 Id., 1130, 3 l. 
17 Id., 119. 
18 Id., 135. 
19 Id., 137. 
20 Id., 138. 
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RULING AND ORDER 
Rule 12(b) Standard 
On a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged enough 
facts in the complaint to state a cause of action.21 The court presumes "the factual allegations in 
the complaint are true and ... draw[ s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff."22 The court's sole concern is "the sufficiency of the pleadings, [and] not the 
underlying merits of (the] case."23 Thus, a plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal only when 
the allegations of the complaint "clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. "24 
Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) 
The Sorensen Defendants first argue that Ms. Bright's claims are barred by collateral 
estoppel because her allegations "are the same basic allegations asserted in the qui tam case and 
are based on the same facts and issues." As discussed at the hearing, the court is not persuaded 
by this argument because the issue decided in the qui tam case - whether Defendants "submitted 
objectively false claims for payment" - is not identical to the issues presented in this case. Nor 
have the Sorensen Defendants established the other elements of collateral estoppel, i.e., that the 
parties are the same or in privity with each other or that the issues in this case have been 
completely, fairly, and fully litigated in the qui tam case.25 
21 Alvarez v. Galetka, 93"3 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). 
22 Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 UT App 232, ,r 16, 263 P.3d 
397,404. 
23 Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Alber/sons, Inc., 2004 UT IOI, 1f 8, 104 P.3d 1226, 1230 (citing Alvarez, 933 P.2d at 989). 
24 Alvarez at 989. 
25 Gunmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ,r 9,232 P.3d 1059, 1067. 
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Statue of Repose 
Defendants argue that Ms. Bright's claims are barred by the statute of repose set forth in 
the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. As set forth below and applying the motion to dismiss 
standard, the court is unable to conclude at this time that the statute of repose was not tolled as 
result of Defendants' alleged affirmative acts to fraudulently conceal their misconduct.26 
"As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action."27 Once a statute begins to run, a plaintiff must 
file her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred. 28 However, there 
are "two narrow settings in which a statute of limitations may be tolled until the discovery of 
facts forming the basis for the cause of action."29 "The first setting ... involves situations in 
which a relevant statute of limitations, by its own terms, mandates application of 
the discovery rule."30 This setting is referred to as the statutory discovery rule. The second 
setting, which is referred to as the equitable discovery rule, applies only where a statute of 
limitations does not, by its own terms, already account for such circumstances."31 
As a preliminary matter, the parties appear to agree that Ms. Bright's claims are subject 
to the statute of limitations found in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which contains a 
statutory discovery rule. The Act also includes a statue of repose, which bars claims commenced 
more than four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence" 
26 At the hearing, Ms. Bright argued the foreign object exception of § 78B-3-404(2)(A) also applies. The court 
disagrees. The catheter was not "wrongly left" within her body. And there is no allegation that Ms. Bright did not 
know that it was placed in her body as part of the closure procedure. 
27 Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 See id. 
29 Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,121, 108 P.3d 741, 746 
,o Id. 
31 Id. at125 
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regardless of when a plaintiff discovers her injury.32 However, "in an action where it is alleged 
that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the 
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs."33 Thus, "(i]n medical malpractice cases, the 
running of the statute of limitations [ can only be] tolled when a patient has been prevented from 
discovering the malpractice by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent 
concealment. "34 
Defendants first argue Ms. Bright failed to plead fraudulent concealment with 
particularity under Rule 9( c ). The court is not convinced that Rule 9( c) requires a plaintiff to 
plead defensive fraudulent concealment in her complaint in anticipation that a defendant may 
assert the statute of limitations or statute of repose in a motion to dismiss. With the exception of 
Roth v. Pedersen discussed further below, the appellate courts in the cases cited by Defendants 
' .. 
were reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, not a dismissal under Rule 
12(b).35 The court accordingly rejects this argument at this juncture. 
Turning to their primary argument, as the court understands it from the briefing and oral 
argument, Defendants assert the statute of repose was not tolled because Ms. Bright has not 
alleged "active" concealment. "Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or 
32 Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-404(1). 
33 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2) ( emphasis added). 
34 Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, 1 31, 244 P.3d 391, 398 (emphasis added) (citing Chapman v. Primory 
Children's H.osp., 784 P.2d 1181, I 184--87 (Utah 1989) (applying statute)). 
" See Berenda v. Longford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) (summary judgment); Chapman v. Primory Children;s 
Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (summary judgment); Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332,244 P.3d 391 (summary 
judgment); see also Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327,333 (Utah 1997) (motion in Iimine and trial). 
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obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts 
known to him. "36 Defendants do not dispute that a health care provider is required to disclose 
"material information concerning the patient's physical condition. This duty to inform stems 
from the fiduciary nature of the relationship and the patient's right to determine what shall or 
shall not be done with his body."37 But, Defendants argue, the statute's inclusion of the phrase 
"affirmatively acted" means that silence or "pure, uninvited non-disclosure" is not enough. 
According to Defendants, Ms. Bright must have "directly engaged with each defendant that she 
accuses of affirmatively fraudulently concealing her injury from her, and then the individual 
defendant must have done something affirmative to prevent her from discovering her legal 
injury." Defendants also appear to argue the "engagement" and "affirmative" responsive act 
must have occurred after the surgery. 
Defendants' argument finds some support in the holding in Roth v. Pedersen, a short 
memorandum decision. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff "failed, as required by the Act, to commence 
litigation within two years of discovery of his legal injury, which occurred, at the latest, in May 
2006" when he initiated legal action against his general surgeon. The Court then addressed the 
plaintiffs alternative argument regarding fraudulent concealment. Because the plaintiff did not 
allege that he consulted with the defendant about the surgery or that the defendant provided him 
with information that misrepresented or concealed his involvement in the surgery, the Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim "for failure to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity. "38 In Roth, the plaintiff had inquiry notice. There was no such notice here. 
36 Jensen, 944 P.2d at 333. 
37 Nixdotfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,354 (Utah 1980) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 Pedersen v. Roth, 2009 UT App 313. 
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Even if the court were to ultimately rule the fraudulent concealment had to occur after the 
surgery, the court is not convinced that "affirmatively acted" in the context of this case means 
that Ms. Bright must have "directly engaged" with the Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's if 
she can demonstrate they were in possession of specific facts they had a duty to disclose and the 
disclosure of such facts would have put her on notice of the alleged misconduct.39 For St. 
Mark's, such facts may include Dr. Sorensen's suspension or any other specific information it 
may have had regarding Dr. Sorensen's alleged misconduct in connection with Ms. Bright's 
surgery. Finally, with respect to Dr. Sorensen, Ms. Bright has alleged some affirmative acts that 
occurred after the surgery, including his follow-up treatment and billing. 
Defendants also argue that Ms. Bright has failed to allege she conducted any 
investigation or inquiry into the medical care she received from Dr. Sorensen, or that her 
investigation was thwarted by any alleged affirmative act on the part of Defendants. A plaintiff 
seeking to save her claims under the discovery rule must demonstrate she exercised reasonable 
diligence in not bringing her claims in a timely manner. This is a fact-intensive matter for the 
fact finder to ascertain except in only "the clearest of cases."40 In determining reasonable 
diligence, the fact finder considers the "difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing and 
diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant affirmatively and fraudulently conceals 
it."41 Here, Ms. Bright's claims relate to an allegedly urmecessary surgery which did not have an 
adverse outcome or any complications. And, unlike in the cases cited, Defendants have failed to 
39 St. Mark's argues that it has no duty to "analyze and disclose judgments by a treating physician, particularly when 
no physical complication is alleged" or to "investigate all procedures performed in its cath lab for medical 
necessity." The court does not necessarily disagree. But the fact that St. Mark's may not have had a duty to analyze 
or investigate does not necessarily mean that it did not have a duty to disclose specific information it may have had 
related to Ms. Bright's surgery. 
40 Russell Packard Dev., Inc., at 139. 
41 Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54. 
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identify any facts that Ms. Bright had knowledge of that would have put her on inquiry notice 
that the surgery was medically unnecessary.42 As the Utah Supreme Court observed in Colosimo, 
Ms. Bright cannot be expected to inquire about the existence of a claim that is entirely concealed 
from her when there is nothing to put her on inquiry notice. Accordingly, the court is unable.to 
conclude that her "failure to investigate possible misconduct" makes this one of the "clearest of 
cases" that warrants dismissal pursuant to a motion to dismiss.43 
Having rejected Defendants' statute ofrepose arguments in light of the motion to dismiss 
standard, the court now turns to the other possible grounds for dismissing Ms. Bright's claims. 
Ms. Bright's Negligence Claim (Second Claim for Relief) 
Defendants argue that Ms. Bright's common Jaw negligence claim is duplicative of her 
negligence (health care malpractice) claim. The court agrees because Ms. Bright has not 
identified a common Jaw or statutory duty that Dr. Sorensen or St. Mark's owed her that is 
independent from the duty that arose from their provider-patient relationship. Accordingly, Ms. 
Bright's Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
" See Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ,r 30, 221 P.3d 256 ("it seems somewhat 
incongruous that an injured person must commence a malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or reasonably 
should have known, of his injury and right of action."); Russell Packard D,,.,,, Inc. at ,r 28 ("to permit one practicing 
a fraud and the concealing it to plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of and 
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud" would be "not only subversive of good morals, but 
also contrary to the plainest principles of justice"); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979) (the law ought 
not to be construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the existence of that right) 
(all internal citations omitted). 
43 See Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ,r 21, 976 P.2d 1202 (interpreting statute in light of obvious unfairness of 
unreasonably barring claims that have been fraudulently concealed). 
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Ms. Bright's Negligent Credentialing Claim (Fourth Claim/or Relief) 
In support of her negligent credentialing claim against St. Mark's, Ms. Bright alleges that 
St. Mark's had a duty to "periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of 
its medical staff' and that it breached this duty, presumably in connection with its granting of 
privileges to Dr. Sorensen. However, "(i]t is the policy of this state that the question of negligent 
credentialing, as applied to health care providers in malpractice suits, is not recognized as a 
cause of action."44 Accordingly, Ms. Bright's Fourth Claim for Relief should be dismissed 
because it fails to state claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Fraudulent Non-Disclosure or Concealment (Fifth Claim/or Relief) 
To prevail on her fraudulent non-disclosure or concealment claim, "a plaintiff must prove 
the following three elements: (I) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate. "45 Ms. Bright alleges Defendants "owed a duty [to] disclose important facts, such 
as the medical necessity of [her] medical care." This is simply the converse of her primary fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation allegation, i.e., Dr. Sorensen told her the procedure was 
medically necessary because she had a high risk of stroke. Ms. Bright also fails to identify a duty 
different or separate from the duty that arises from the provider-patient relationship. Thus, the 
court concludes her fraudulent concealment claim against the Sorensen Defendants is subsumed 
within her malpractice, fraud, and/or negligent misrepresentation claims. 
With respect to St. Mark's, the court agrees that Ms. Bright fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. She does not plead any facts from which the court may infer that St. 
44 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-425. 
45 Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 1[ 24, 48 P.3d 235 
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Mark's knew that her pa1iicular surgery was not medically necessary prior to the surgery.46 And 
while St. Mark's alleged failure to notify patients that Dr. Sorensen's privileges had been 
suspended for performing unnecessary closure procedures may be sufficient to defeat a motion to 
dismiss based on the statute of repose, it cannot form the basis of an affirmative fraudulent 
concealment claim. Indeed, Ms. Bright could not have relied on St. Mark's silence regarding the 
suspension in agreeing to the surgery because the suspension happened after her surgery. 
Accordingly, the court dismisses Ms. Bright's fraudulent concealment claim.47 
Ms. Bright's Other Claims Are Not Subsumed into a Single Malpractice Claim 
Defendants argue Ms. Bright's other claims should be dismissed because they are 
subsumed into her First Claim for Relief for Negligence - Health Care Malpractice. Specifically, 
Defendants argue that all alleged breaches of duty in a provider-patient relationship are "properly 
actionable under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and not as separate claims." They base 
this argument on § 78B-3-403, which defines a malpractice action against a health care provider 
as "any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of 
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider."48 
Although the court agrees that Ms. Bright's negligence claim is subsumed within her malpractice 
claim, the court is not otherwise persuaded that the Act prevents Ms. Bright from bringing her 
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy claims, which do not necessarily depend 
upon an "alleged breach of duty to provide accurate information concerning the necessity of 
46 In general, a hospital does not owe an independent duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to treatment. See 
Buu Nguyen v. IHC Med Servs., Inc., 2102 UT App 288, ~ 11,288 P.3d 1084. 
47 Additionally, if there is other material information that Defendants failed to disclose prior to her surgery, Ms. 
Bright has not sufficiently identified it as required by Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is 
discussed further below. 
48 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403. 
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medical care relating to the PFO closure procedure" as argued by Defendants. Indeed, duty is 
not an element of a fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or civil conspiracy claim. 
Rule 9(c)'s Particularity Requirement for Affirmative Claims 
Ms. Bright's fraud, misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy claims against Defendants 
implicate Rule 9( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a plaintiff to state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud. Pleadings satisfy this standard only if they 
include a sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying the claim,49 including 
the who, what, when, where, and how. so Defendants argue Ms. Bright has failed to satisfy this 
standard and, consequently, these claims should be dismissed. As discussed further below in 
connection with each claim, the court concludes that Ms. Bright has complied with Rule 9( c ). 
Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud Claims (Third and Sixth Claims for Relief) 
With respect to her fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, Ms. Bright must prove 
"(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which 
was false and ( 4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for 
the purpose of inducing [her] to act upon it and (6) that [she], acting reasonably and in ignorance 
of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to [her] injury and 
darnage."51 
The court concludes Ms. Bright has pied her fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims with sufficient particularity as to Dr. Sorensen. Ms. Bright alleges the "who" (Dr. 
Sorensen), "what" (false statement that she had a high risk of debilitating stroke and PFO closure 
49 Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, 18,323 P.3d 571. 
so Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321,119,290 P.3d 930. 
51 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19,110,344 P.3d 156, 159. 
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was necessary to prevent strokes), "where" (Dr. Sorensen's offices), "when" (November 4, 
2009), and "how" (Dr. Sorensen told her the false statement directly and provided her with a 
handout containing false statements and data). She sets forth how she reasonably relied on the 
allegedly false statements in deciding to have the surgery and how she was damaged thereby. 
In contrast, Ms. Bright has not pied these claims with sufficient particularity with respect 
to St. Mark's. It does not appear St. Mark's made any statements to Ms. Bright prior to the 
surgery. And to the extent her claims against St. Mark's are based on a failure to disclose, Ms. 
Bright has not alleged facts from which the court can infer that St. Mark's owed a duty to her 
prior to surgery or that she somehow relied on St. Mark's silence in deciding to have the surgery. 
Civil Conspiracy (Seventh Claim for Relief) 
With respect to her civil conspiracy claim, Ms. Bright must prove "(I) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object 
or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof."52 In addition, Ms. Bright must prove an underlying tort."53 
The court determines that Ms. Bright has satisfied Rule 9(c) because she has sufficiently 
identified the co-conspirators (the Sorensen Defendants and St. Mark's), the object to be 
accomplished (increasing income for the Sorensen Defendants and profits for St. Mark's by 
performing medically unnecessary surgeries), the meeting of the minds ( discussing during hiring 
and credentialing how Dr. Sorensen would perform the closures and under what circumstances, 
ignoring complaints by other physicians, providing special treatment to Dr. Sorensen, and 
advertising and promoting Dr. Sorenson's closure practice), the unlawful, over acts (making 
52 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 2015 UT App at 1 16 (citing Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987)). 
53 Pu/tuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, 121, 199 P.3d 971,978. 
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fraudulent statements, performing medically unnecessary closures at St. Mark's, falsifying 
records), and the damages (undergoing and paying for a medically unnecessary surgery and 
follow-up treatment). Ms. Bright identifies the underlying tort as fraud. 54 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part. 
With respect to the Sorensen Defendants, their Motion is GRANTED as to (a) the Second 
Claim for Relief (Negligence) because it is duplicative of the First Claim for Relief (Negligence 
- Malpractice) and (b) the Fifth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Non-Disclosure/Concealment) 
because it is subsumed within other claims and/or she has failed to plead it with the requisite 
specificity. The Motion is DENIED as to all other claims against the Sorensen Defendants. 
With respect to St. Mark's, its Motion is GRANTED as to (a) the Second Claim for 
Relief (Negligence) because it is duplicative, (b) the Fourth Claim for Relief (Negligent 
Credentialing) because it is not recognized in Utah, and ( c) the Third and Sixth Claims for Relief 
(Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud) because Ms. Bright has not pied them with 
particularity. It is also GRANTED as to the Fifth Claim for Relief (Fraudulent Non-
Disclosure/Concealment) because it is subsumed within other claims and/or she has failed to 
plead it with particularity. The Motion is DENIED as to all other claims against St. Mark's. 
RULE 16 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
At counsel's convenience, they should contact the court's judicial team to schedule a 
Rule 16 scheduling conference to discuss a scheduling order and the status of the other pending 
cases. 
" Although the court has dismissed the fraud claim against St. Mark's, this does not necessarily mean that a civil 
conspiracy claim based on a fraud also must be dismissed. See, e.g., Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 
(because defendant did not, by its own actions, defraud plaintiff or authorize another to do so, defendant's liability 
can only be established by proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy to defraud), 
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SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ay of June, 2018 
Judge Laura S. Scott 
Third Judicial District Court 
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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Tier 3 Filing) 
(Jury Demanded) 
Civil No. 170906130 
Judge Matthew Bates 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
I. Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL. (St. Mark's) is a for-profit corporation based 
in Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 1200 E 3900 S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124. St. Mark's Registered Agent for Service CT Corporation System, 1108 
E South Union Ave., Midvale UT 84047. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude,joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Pia Merlo-Schmucker. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102. 
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 




10. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septa! defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septa! tissue to form between the atria, PF Os can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovale fails to close.1 
11. Life threatening ASD's are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts. The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the forarnen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's almost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people, including the Plaintiff. 
3 
13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
15. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
16. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant St. Mark's and at other hospitals. From 
roughly 2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, 
many of those at St. Mark's. Dr. Sorensen performed the procedures at a rate that dwarfed the rest 
of the country by a factor often-to-twenty fold, making him a true outlier. 
17. The administration at St. Mark's was on notice because of the sheer volume of the 
procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other practitioners 
and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly performing 
4 
unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. St. Mark's ignored obvious warnings to 
halt these procedures so that it could secure and maintain a lucrative stream of income. 
18. Further, during the hiring and credentialing process at St. Mark's, Sorensen advised 
St. Mark's representatives of how he would perform closures and under what conditions. And a 
result, St. Mark's was aware that he would be performing unnecessary closures on patients that 
did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. 
19. Further, Sorensen's cardiac privileges at another hospital were suspended on or 
about June 27, 2011, following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed 
multiple, medically unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health 
and safety of the patients treated. And St. Mark's CEO Steve Bateman and physician liaison Nikki 
Gledhill were aware of Sorensen's suspension. 
20. Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none.existed. For instance, Sorensen often 
created medical charts that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of 
suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The 
effort to disguise the true diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always 
aware of and understood the true standard of care for these procedures. 
21. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff. 
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22. Despite the fact that St. Mark's knew that Sorensen was performing medically 
unnecessary closures, and knew that Sorensen had been suspended for performing medically 
unnecessary closures at another hospital, St. Mark's Hospital continued to court Sorensen's 
business, provide a platform and assistance to Sorensen, and advertise and promote Sorensen and 
closure practice to the public for its own financial gain. 
23. In particular, the catheterization lab staff at St. Mark's became financially 
dependent on Sorensen's incredible volume. The majority of patients at St. Mark's cardiac 
catheterization laboratory came from Sorensen, dwarfing all other cardiology business at St. 
Mark's. As a result, St. Mark's provided special treatment to Sorensen with staffing and scheduling 
in its catheterization lab, often to the detriment of true cardiac patients and other cardiologists. St. 
Mark's also provided open access for PFO industry representatives to the lab and 
personnel. Industry provided order-in meals were available to those catheterization lab personnel 
that were willing to share in the largesse. 
24. Ultimately, St. Mark's made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform 
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse 
Plaintiff, her insurance company, or any of its other patients who had procedures performed 
unnecessarily. Instead, St. Mark's kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
25. On December 21, 2010, a transthoracic echocardiograrn (TTE) was performed on 
Ms. Merlo-Schmucker in Dr. Sorensen's office. Medical records indicate that the patient was 
referred by Tyler Williams MD and that the indication is cognitive changes and a murmur. A 
transcranial doppler study (TCD) is performed as well. The echocardiograrn was interpreted to 
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show "severe right to left shunt after valsalva." The TCD study was interpreted to show 5+/5 
conductance with calibrated respiratory strain." 
26. On December 28, 2010, a brain MRI was performed at Western Neurological 
Associates. This did not conclusively demonstrate evidence of a previous stroke. A "tiny 
nonspecific focus of flair sequence hyperintensity" is described. A differential diagnosis is given 
that includes "embolic disease." But the radiologist also dictates "imaging artifact is not entirely 
excluded." 
27. On February 10, 2011, a percutaneous closure ofa septa! defect was accomplished 
using a 25 mm Gore HELEX ASD device. This was guided by intracardiac echo. Dr. Sorensen 
referred to the septa! defect as an atrial septa! defect. Following deployment of the device, color 
flow doppler showed no left to right flow and a contrast bubble study was negative for right to left 
shunting. 
28. On February 11, 2011, pnor to discharge from St. Mark's, a transthoracic 
echocardiogram was performed. The report states that color flow doppler "does not demonstrate 
a residual shunt," but a bubble study was not performed. 
29. The accepted indications for closure of an atrial septa! defect include right 
ventricular chamber enlargement, which was not seen on Ms. Merlo-Schmucker's 
echocardiograms, orthodeoxia-platypnea, which was not described by Dr. Sorensen, and 
paradoxical embolism. 
30. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. A comprehensive evaluation for 
causes of "cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain (which was done in this case), imaging 
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of the extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for 
paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower 
extremity venous doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper 
coagulability workup. But Sorensen did not perform the required comprehensive evaluation. 
31. To persuade Plaintiff to undergo closure, Defendant Sorensen represented to 
Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ASD and 
that closure was medically necessary. In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, 
including a history of cryptogenic stroke, is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, 
Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff. 
Sorensen's patient literature contained fraudulent misrepresentations, unsupported data and 
statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent F oramen Ovale )" 
• "Strokes resulting from septa] defects have a 50% mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." 
• "Stroke reduction to less than I%" 
• "Septa] Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" 
• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" 
In addition, to the handout Sorensen made other misrepresentations to Plaintiff both in orally and 
in writing. These misrepresentations include: 
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• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy ofNeurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies referenced by Sorensen showed no such thing. 
• Defendant Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by I CAEL 
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the ICAEL logo on 
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by I CAEL and this was 
false. 
These false statements were intended to and did in fact induce Plaintiff to undergo closure at St. 
Mark's by inducing fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted 
treatment options, misrepresenting the indication for closure, and downplaying the risks of closure. 
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32. Despite St. Mark's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, 
it did nothing to notify Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. Instead, St. Mark's actively allowed Sorensen's 
practice to continue in order to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on 
patients like Ms. Merlo-Schmucker. In fact, St. Mark's has to this day actively concealed its 
knowledge about Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent practices at its facility from patients, third party 
payers, and the public, and has retained the money earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary 
surgeries. 
33. Plaintiff could not have known that the information provided by Defendants was 
false. Instead, she trusted that Defendants Sorensen and St. Mark's, as her health care providers, 
were being truthful. Further, even if she had been aware of some of the factual 
mischaracterizations, as a non-expert she could not have understood their implications as it relates 
the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
34. Because of Defendants' fraudulent statements and omissions, Plaintiff was until 
recently unaware of her cause of action. In fact, Plaintiff only learned of the Defendants' 
misconduct as a result lawyer advertising. Her diligent investigation resulted in the noticing and 
filing of this action within the statutory period. 
35. Because of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff suffered significant damages, including: 
1. undergoing an unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, 
ii. paying significant medical expenses to Defendants, 
111. physical pain, and 
emotional anguish as a result of being told she was at immediate risk of a debilitating 
or even deadly stroke. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE) 
36. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
3 7. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
38. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required. 
39. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
40. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff's medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
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candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; and 
41. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional 
anguish. 
42. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
43. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
44. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
45. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
46. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
47. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
48. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be determined at trial. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
49. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
50. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
51. Defendants' representations that Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, and 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
52. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiffs medical care was true. 
5:J.. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiffs medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
54. Defendants had a financial interest m performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
55. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
56. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 
57. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
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58. Defendant St. Mark's owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the 
selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to 
periodically monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
59. Defendant St. Mark's breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection 
of its medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and 
reviewing the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
60. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant St. Mark's 
caused harm to Plaintiff. 
61. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
62. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
63. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiffs medical care, to Plaintiff. 
64. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
65. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
66. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
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67. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
68. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
69. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
70. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiffs medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
71. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiffs medical care. 
72. Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
73. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 
74. Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made 
by Defendants. 
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75. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
76. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
77. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
78. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SCG, and Defendant St. Mark's to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, 
including Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. 
Defendants agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of 
medical procedures to Plaintiff. 
79. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, 
and Defendant St. Mark's in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
80. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant 
St. Mark's, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators 
and the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
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8 I. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
82. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
83. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
84. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiffs cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
85. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor St. Mark's, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary 
medical surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
86. Neither Sorensen, nor St. Mark's, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made 
a public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff, that they may 
have had medically unnecessary closures. 
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87. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the recovery 
sought by Plaintiff. 
88. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability recently. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
89. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently. Such conduct tolls 
the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b). 
90. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December 2017. 
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
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Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following 
via the Court's ECF filing system and/or Email on 14th day of December, 2017: 
Eric P. Schoonveld 
Tawni J. Anderson 
Nathan E. Dorsey 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
111 East Broadway, Suite 700 






Attorneys for St. Mark's Hospital 
Michael J. Miller 
19 
Strong & Hanni 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
mmiller@strongandhanni.com 
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, MD. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
Isl Rhome D. Zabriskie 




Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
Counsel.for Plaint!tf 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 




SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; 










Case No. 170906130 
Judge Patrick Corum 
1 of 6 
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR 








Following full briefing, this matter came before the Court for hearing and argument on 
May I, 2018. On May 18, 2018, Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiff Pia Merlo-Schmucker; Eric Schoonveld and Drew Warth appeared on behalf 
of Defendant St. Mark's Hospital ("St. Mark's"); and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke 
appeared on behalf of Defendants Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
("Sorensen Defendants") for a telephonic ruling, which is reduced to writing here and is the 
Order of the Court. 
The matters before the Court are St. Mark's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint and the Sorensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. St. 
Mark's Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the 
Sorensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED. 
Both St. Mark's and the Sorensen Defendants moved to dismiss all claims in the 
Amended Complaint under Rule l 2(b) on the grounds that all claims therein were barred by the 
four-year statute of repose found in 78B-3-404(1) and (2) of Utah's Medical Malpractice Act. 
Those provisions require that claims be brought within four-years of the date of the alleged act, 
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omission, neglect, or occurrence unless a patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct. 
It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively 
within the meaning of the statute to fraudulently conceal anything. The word "affirmatively" was 
presumably and advisedly put into the statute-78B-3-404(1}-with meaning, and it appears to 
have a meaning different from the common law. Under the statute, some affirmative act of 
concealment is necessary to maintain an otherwise time-barred action. Defendants' argument 
that inaction or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar appears to be 
well taken. 
That being said the Court is not convinced this issue is procedurally ripe at the Rule 12(b) 
stage and questions whether the Plaintiff is obligated to combat an affirmative defense, however 
likely or inevitably it is to be raised, in its initial pleading. 
The Defendants have presented cases that clearly indicate that the Court has discretion to 
address these issues under a l 2(b) motion, however those cases are distinguishable in the Court's 
view. Roth v. Pederson was a judgment on the pleadings so the procedural context is similar, but, 
based on what the Court can tell from the opinion, the relevant allegations in the Roth complaint 
regarding fraudulent concealment were extremely sparse and entirely conclusory. 2009 UT App 
313, 2009 WL 3490974 (unpublished). That is not the case here; the allegations have more detail 
and more substance than what was apparently pied in Roth. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. is more on point than Roth as it was a Rule 12(b) motion, converted into a Rule 56 Motion. 
Tucker clearly gives a court discretion to entertain statute of limitations defenses in a motion to 
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dismiss but did so under limited circumstances, which are not present here. 2002 UT 54, ,r 8, 53 
P.3d 947. In Tucker the plaintiff did not appear to offer any argument to counter the application 
of the statute of limitations and there did not appear to be any dispute as to whether it would 
have in fact barred the action, the plaintiff only argued that issue should not have be decided at 
that stage. It is a close call, but the Court feels the Plaintiff in this case has done enough to move 
her case into the next stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motions on the statute 
of limitations/repose issue. 
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs fraud-based claims for failure to allege them 
with particularity as required by Rule 9( c ). First, as to Plaintiffs claim for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Court finds the Amended Complaint contains no particular allegations as 
to misrepresentations made by St. Mark's Hospital. Similarly, Plaintiffs fraud and fraudulent 
concealment claims (as opposed to the exception to the statute of repose) also fail as to St. 
Mark's for failing to satisfy Rule 9(c). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS St. Mark's Hospital's 
motion and DISMISSES the negligent misrepresentation (Count III), fraudulent concealment 
(Count V), and fraud (Count VI) claims as to St. Mark's Hospital. As to the Sorensen 
Defendants, the Court finds the Amended Complaint alleges with particularity the fraud-based 
claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motions to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation, 
fraudulent concealment, and fraud claims as to the Sorensen Defendants. Further, the Court finds 
the Amended Complaint adequately alleges civil conspiracy and therefore DENIES the motions 
to dismiss the civil conspiracy (Count VII) claims as to all Defendants. 
The Sorensen Defendants further argue that all of Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed 
under the doctrine of claim preclusion due to the dismissal of the separate qui tam action, which 
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involved claims by a relator under the federal False Claims Act. That dismissal is currently on 
appeal with the Tenth Circuit. 1 find that the issues in the qui tam and this action are not 
identical. Further, the parties are not identical, the parties are not in privity, and there has not 
been a final judgment in the qui tam action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen 
Defendants' motion to dismiss all claims under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
Finally, the Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and civil conspiracy are not cognizable as claims distinct from 
Plaintiff's medical negligence claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does define a 
malpractice action to include any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to 
or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care 
provider, it does so to identify the causes of action governed by the Act. But the Act does not 
foreclose a plaintiff from pleading different causes of action or create one omnibus cause of 
action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants' motion. The Court's 
signature appears at the top of the first page of this order. 
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
and seal at the top of the first page*** 
-----------END OF DOCUMENT-----------
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and hereby complain for causes of action 
against the above-captioned Defendants, alleging as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
I. Plaintiff Lisa Tapp is, and at all relevant times has been, a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
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2. Defendant SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D. was, at all relevant times, a licensed 
physician providing health care services in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR GROUP (SCG), was at all material 
times, a Utah professional corporation in the business of providing health care services to residents 
of Utah. Defendant SCG's principal place of business is located at 5169 Cottonwood Street, No. 
610, Murray, Utah. Defendant Sherman Sorensen owned and operated SCG as his primary medical 
practice. 
4. Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc. (JHC) is a not-for-profit corporation based in 
Salt Lake City, Utah with its principal place of business and corporate office at 36 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. IHC operates several healthcare facilities under d/b/a's, including 
Intermountain Medical Center, which has its principal place of business and corporate office at 
5100 South State Street, Murray, Utah. IHC's Registered Agent for Service is Anne D. Armstrong, 
36 South State St. Suite 2200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
5. Upon information and belief, at all material times, each of the Defendants were, or 
may have been, an agent, servant, employer, employee, joint venture, partner, and/or alter ego of 
one or more of each of the remaining Defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose 
and scope of such agency, servitude,joint venture, alter ego, partnership, or employment, and with 
the authority, consent, approval, and/or ratification of each remaining Defendant. 
6. At all material times, Defendants were health care providers within the meaning of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-401 et seq., and each Defendant 
provided health care services to Lisa Tapp. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-
102. 
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8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. 
9. In bringing this action, Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements regarding 
pre-litigation review of this matter as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-3-416. 
BACKGROUND 
I 0. This case is one of more than a thousand cases that are presently working their way 
through the prelitigation process, which involve the medically unnecessary heart surgery by Dr. 
Sherman Sorensen related to two kinds of holes in the heart. One is called an atrial septa] defect 
(ASD), and the other is a patent foramen ovale (PFO). Both are holes in the wall of tissue (septum) 
between the left and right upper chambers of the heart (atria). An ASD is considered a birth defect 
and is a failure of the septa! tissue to form between the atria, PFO's can only occur after birth when 
the foramen ovale fails to close.' 
I I. Life threatening ASD' s are generally discovered at birth and corrected 
immediately. However, there are billions of adults who have small openings between the left and 
right atriums of their hearts.2 The foramen ovale is an opening located in the wall separating the 
two upper chambers of the heart, the atrial septum, which is used during fetal circulation to redirect 
blood through the heart. In 75% of the population, the foramen ovale closes at birth when increased 
blood pressure on the left side of the heart forces the opening to close. In those cases, where the 
foramen ovale does not close at birth, a patent foramen ovale (PFO) results. 
1 Dr. Sorensen at times earlier in his career referred to these two conditions interchangeably, but 
for insurance reimbursement purposes decided that all PFO's were ASD's later in his practice. 
Either way, and no matter what he called them, he closed holes indiscriminately and without 
medical justification on thousands of people including the Plaintiff. 
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12. Approximately 25% of the healthy population have a PFO and will never require 
any treatment or evaluation. Apart from extremely rare cases, patients with a PFO remain 
completely unaware of the presence of the PFO because it's almost never associated with 
symptoms. Persistent patency of the foramen ovale is considered a normal anatomic variation. 
13. Only if a patient has a recurrence of cryptogenic (originating from unexplained 
causes) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA), likely due to paradoxical embolization through 
a PFO, and despite optimal medical therapy, may it be appropriate to close the PFO. Generally, 
this closure is performed through a percutaneous surgical procedure. In the percutaneous 
procedure, a patient undergoes a cardiac catheterization to determine the size and location of the 
PFO. 
14. There has long been general agreement in the medical community-as far back as 
2003-that PFO closure is not medically necessary, except in the limited circumstances where 
there is a confirmed diagnosis of a recurrent cryptogenic stroke or TIA, despite optimum medical 
management. At all material times, no widely accepted medical group specializing in cardiology 
in the United States has ever recommended, advised, or suggested that closure is appropriate for 
stroke or migraine prevention to patients that have not had recurrent crypotogenic strokes. 
15. In 2011, Defendant IHC adopted internal Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of 
Septa! Defects of the Atrium that mirrored those promulgated by the American Heart 
Association/American Stroke Association (AHA/ASA). The Guidelines state that "PFO closure 
may be considered for patients with recurrent cryptogenic stroke (CS) despite optimal medical 
therapy." The IHC Guidelines note that PFO closure is only appropriate for "recurrent, confirmed, 
clinical cryptogenic TIA or stroke." 
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16. PFO could also, under Defendant IHC's Guidelines, be considered for "patients 
with a single well-documented significant stroke or systemic emboli in a high-risk patient who has 
been comprehensively evaluated for alternative cause of embolic stroke." Under either 
circumstance, the Guidelines require that the cardiologists ensure that the diagnosis of PFO and 
cryptogenic stroke or embolism is confirmed by an independent neurology consult or a _brain CT 
or MRI, a MRA of the head and neck, an ambulatory telemetry monitor for atrial fibrillation, and 
a TTE with bubbles to confirm the diagnosis. Defendant IHC's Guidelines make clear that PFO 
closure is never indicated for migraine headaches. 
17. Defendant IHC's Guidelines are clear that PFO closure for migraine can only be 
performed in the clinical trial setting and that there is currently "no RCT [randomized clinical 
trials] to support use of PFO closure in the treatment of migraine headaches or asymptomatic 
white-matter lesions." These latter two categories of symptoms are precisely what Defendant 
Sorensen treated Plaintiff for with a PFO closure. 
18. Defendant Sorensen frequently touted his excessive volume, touting that he has 
more than a "10 year/3000 device history" of utilizing various devices (i.e. Amplatzer and Gore) 
to perform PFO and ASD closures. Defendant Sorensen often referred patients to his "research" 
and "data" for PFO and ASD closures at www.sorensenmd.com. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
19. The following general allegations are common to all claims alleged herein: 
20. As noted, Defendant Dr. Sorensen is a cardiologist and was practicing 
interventional cardiology. He had privileges at Defendant IHC and at other hospitals. From roughly 
2002 to 2012, Defendant Sorensen performed more than 4,000 PFO and ASD closures, the 
majority of those at IHC. The administration at IHC was on notice because of the sheer volume 
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of the procedures performed by Defendant Sorensen and because of complaints from other 
practitioners and employees that Defendant Sorensen was engaged in a practice of regularly 
performing unnecessary, invasive cardiac procedures on his patients. Defendants enriched 
themselves by submitting false and fraudulent medical billing to insurance companies, including 
Plaintiff's, for medically unnecessary procedures. 
21. During the hiring and credentialing process at IHC, Sorensen advised IHC 
representatives of the medical treatment he was qualified to perform, and specifically informed 
IHC how he would perform PFO closures. These procedures would include performing PFO and 
ASD closures on patients that did not have recurrent cryptogenic strokes. Despite this, Defendant 
IHC gave Sorensen hospital privileges, hired and paid him, and allowed him to utilize their 
catheterization laboratory to perform these PFO procedures. 
22. Sorensen's cardiac privileges at IHC were suspended on or about June 27, 2011, 
following an internal investigation concluded that Sorensen had performed multiple, medically 
unnecessary PFO closures and that Sorensen represented a threat to the health and safety of the 
patients treated at IHC. 
23. The letter from IHC to Defendant Sorensen informing him in writing of his 
suspension (effective June 27, 2011 through July 11,201 !), stated that the suspension was "taken 
in good faith to prevent a threat to the health or safety of patients" at IHC and to "provide the 
Medical Executive Committee the opportunity to further evaluate the patient care you have 
provided, your professional conduct within the hospital and [to J determine if additional action 
regarding your membership and privileges should be taken beyond the 14 day suspension." 
24. Dr. Sorensen's suspension was the direct result of the IHC's acknowledgement of 
what it had known for years, that Sorensen had performed thousands of medically unnecessary 
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PFO closures at IHC. The suspension was a reversal of sorts for IHC because it had long 
encouraged, profited, and provided a haven for Defendant Sorensen's practice. 
25. Further, Defendant Sorensen and IHC created false statements and documents to 
conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing medically unnecessary closures. These statements 
include documenting migraine or stroke history where none existed, such as Plaintiffs case. 
26. Defendant IHC supplied Sorensen with its catheterization lab facilities, hospital 
staff such as nurses, administrative, and other support staff, and privileges to perform these 
procedures whenever he saw fit, including for Plaintiff Lisa Tapp's PFO procedure in October 
2008. For example, the Patient Information pamphlet passed on to Plaintiff (and many other 
patients) touts "a dedicated, specialized team of echo, nursing, catheterization laboratory, and 
physician members" as "Why Our Program May Be Right For You" (Slide 30). 
27. Sorensen would routinely mislead his patients, who had no previous strokes or 
TIAs, into believing that they were at extreme risk of debilitating stroke because of their PFO or 
ASD. He would further mislead them that a closure procedure would be effective and was 
medically necessary in order to prevent strokes. These misrepresentations were made to the vast 
majority of his patients, including Plaintiff. 
28. Despite his representations to his patients, Sorensen often created medical charts 
that falsely reflected that the patients had suffered from, or were at risk of suffering from, recurrent 
cryptogenic stroke in order to get insurance to pay for the procedure. The effort to disguise the true 
diagnosis and reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always aware of and understood 
the true standard of care for these procedures. IHC knew or should have known through a cursory 
review of the patients' files that they did not meet the closure indications in the standard of care. 
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IHC, SCG, and Sorensen engaged in a conspiracy and/or concert of action, with each other to profit 
from the perpetuation of Sorensen's medically unnecessary closures. 
29. In a report released to the entire Department of Cardiology at IHC, it reported that 
the study showed that "compliance with the guidelines for performing PFO closures" at IHC was 
"less than ideal." The review showed that the Guidelines had been violated in many of the cases 
reviewed. 
30. Even though it did not issue these Guidelines until 2011, at all times relevant to this 
case, IHC knew that septa! closures were rarely indicated. For years IHC ignored the loud 
objections from its own medical staff and leadership, including the Director of the Catheterization 
Laboratory, Dr. Revenaugh, and the Medical Director for Cardiovascular Services at 
Intermountain Healthcare, Dr. Donald L. Lappe, as well as written warnings and complaints from 
Professor Andrew Michaels of the University of Utah. Further, IHC was informed by Dr. Nancy 
Futrell, a neurologist who was a co-investigator with Defendant Sorensen on a trial performed at 
IHC for the closure devices used by Defendant Sorensen, that Defendant Sorensen was performing 
unnecessary closures outside of the criteria set by the trials. She spoke with several individuals 
associated with IHC regarding Dr. Sorensen, including Dr. Lappe, chief of cardiology; William 
Hamilton, medical director; Jeffrey Anderson, associate chief of cardiology; and Liz Hammond. 
31. After Sorensen's 14-day suspension, he returned to work at IHC on or about July 
12, 2011. It immediately became apparent that Sorensen had no intention of complying with the 
IHC Guidelines for PFO closures, and that he would continue to perform medically unnecessary 
procedures on patients not suffering from recurrent cryptogenic stroke despite optimal medical 
therapy. Because Sorensen refused to comply with the Guidelines and represented an immediate 
threat of harm to his patients, IHC moved to suspend Sorensen from practice in September 201 I. 
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Sorensen and IHC entered a Settlement Agreement, which was designed to prevent his permanent 
suspension. However, within days of entering the Agreement, Sorensen was notified by IHC that 
he was in violation of the Agreement. IHC threatened to take immediate action to suspend him, 
and to report his misconduct to the National Practitioner Database. Sorensen promptly resigned to 
avoid these adverse consequences. 
32. In Fall 20 I I/Winter 2012, Dr. James L. Orford, listed in the Cardiology Department 
at Intermountain Health Center, authored an article "Understanding the Heart Defect - Patent 
Foramen Ovale" in The Classroom on Intermountain's website. This publication lists 
"Intermountain Medical Group" with a link at the bottom. 
33. Speaking on behalf oflntermountain, Dr. Orford states the following: 
• "Because PFO is very common and never causes any problems in most patients, 
undergoing surgery to possibly prevent migraines and/or stroke usually isn't worth 
the risk." 
• "It has been noted that PFO is more common .in patients who experience migraine 
with aura, but may patients with a PFO do not have migraine headaches and many 
migraine patients do not have a PFO." 
• "Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence that fixing a PFO will benefit 
migraines." 
• "In a few cases, where patients have already suffered a confirmed cryptogenic 
stroke without any possible cause, closing a PFO may be a viable option to prevent 
future strokes." 
• "However, it is important to consult with a neurologist and a cardiologist to 
determine all of your options and whether surgical closure is recommended." 
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• "Patients are also encouraged to enroll in a clinical trial so their response to 
treatments can be studied, allowing scientists to learn more about this condition." 
• "As leaders in cardiology, Intermountain Healthcare is always very conscientious 
regarding how new technology is applied. For this reason, the Intermountain 
Medical Group instituted specific "Guidelines for Percutaneous Closure of Septa! 
Defects" throughout all our hospitals and clinics." 
• "We believe it is important to have clear, positive evidence for both the short-term 
and long-term consequences of any procedure." 
Despite this publication and clear recognition, IHC did nothing to alert patients, including Lisa 
Tapp, that no "clear, positive" evidence existed that PFO closure was effective for stroke 
prevention in absence of a history of cryptogenic strokes or for migraine headache prevention. 
34. Defendant IHC also published "Fact Sheet for Patients and Families - PFO and 
ASD Closure in the Cath Lab" with a publication range of 2011-2016. Among the recognized 
risks of a PFO or ASD Closure include: temporary leg numbness or weakness in the first few 
hours, bruising, bleeding, infection, or blood vessel damage whether cathether(s) were inserted, 
damage to the heart muscle that may require open heart surgery, abnormal heart rhythm, blood 
clots, heart attack or stroke, negative reaction to anesthetic or dye, and unforeseen complications. 
While these risks are "uncommon" they are present for PFO and ASD Closures. The Fact Sheet 
for Patients and Families also states the following: 
• "Why Might I need a PFO or ASD Closure? You might need a PFO closure if you've 
had a stroke that is related to PFO." 
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• "What are the benefits of a PFO or ASD closure procedure? PFO Closure has not been 
found to reliably reduce migraines. Also, it is not indicated unless you've had a 
previous TIA or stroke." 
35. Despite the results of this audit, patient literature representations, stated opinion of 
IHC cardiologists, and ample evidence that Defendant Sorensen had performed thousands of PFO 
closures, Defendant IHC deliberately and consciously chose not to expand its audit to other PFO 
closure patients from past years, including Plaintiff Lisa Tapp Defendant IHC never released 
information to the public that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO procedures, as 
this information was kept internal. 
36. IHC made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform patients that they may 
have had a medically unnecessary surgery, and chose not to reimburse Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, her 
insurance company, (or any patients) who had procedures performed unnecessarily. Instead, IHC 
kept the profits for itself. 
PLAINTIFF LISA T APP'S PFO CLOSURE AND INJURIES 
37. Plaintiff Lisa Tapp was 43 years old when she underwent the percutaneous closure 
of a patent foramen oval at Intermountain Medical Center in Salt Lake County on September 18, 
2008. The procedure was performed by Defendant Sherman Sorensen, M.D. using an 18 millimeter 
Amplatzer septa! occlude device-a device not approved by the FDA for use in this manner. The 
safety and efficacy for using the Amplatzer device in a PFO closure to prevent strokes ·on patients 
without recurrent cryptogenic stroke has never been established, even to this day. 
38. In fact, at all material times the Amplatzer septa! occcluder has been indicated for 
patients with "echocardiographic evidence of ostium secundum atrial septa! defect." The 
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Amplatzer instructions for use unequivocally state, "The use of this device has not been studied in 
patients with patent foreman ovale." 
39. Prior to Lisa's percutaneous closure, she underwent a neurological history and 
physical by Walter Reichert M.D. on August 15, 2008. The patient described a two-month history 
of continuous paresthesias in the back of the neck and head. She also described "mild numbness 
in her right thumb and hand while she is seated." Importantly, a detailed neurological exam did 
not show any abnormalities; specifically, there were no motor/strength deficits and no sensory 
deficits. 
40. On August 20, 2008, a brain MRI, MRA of the intracranial arteries and an MRI of 
the cervical spine were performed at Western Neurological Associates, where Dr. Reichert 
practiced. The brain MRI was interpreted to show about fifteen bilateral non-specific white matter 
lesions. A differential diagnosis is given for this finding: "includes demyelinating disease, 
migraine headaches, vasculitis/inflammatory disease, chronic microvascular ischemic disease, 
hypertension and post-traumatic sequela." The differential diagnosis did not include embolic 
strokes or events. 
41. On September 2, 2008, Lisa received a transthoracic echocardiogram and 
transcranial doppler study in Defendant Sorensen's office, SCG. The transthoracic echo is 
interpreted to show an abnormal bubble study consistent with a right to left shunt across the atrial 
septum and the transcranial doppler study is interpreted to show 5/5 conductance with a valsalva 
maneuver. The 5/5 conductance is used to place the patient at "high risk stratification for stroke." 
42. On this same day, Defendant Sorensen performed a history and physical on Lisa. 
Among Defendant Sorensen's findings, he concluded that Lisa did not have hyper coagulability 
(despite a lack of testing for this), that she developed "well-defined symptoms of hemisensory" 
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(despite no evidence of this in Lisa's neurological exam), and that she had a history of migraines 
(despite Lisa's own claims to the contrary). Defendant Sorensen went on to state that Lisa had "a 
change in her level of consciousness" and that her "right-sided weakness has been persistent." 
None of these findings were reflected in Lisa's neurological exam. Defendant Sorensen claims the 
non-specific white matter lesions seen on Lisa's brain MRI "are, therefore, most likely embolic." 
Defendant Sorensen made this diagnosis with virtually no medical support. 
43. To persuade Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure, Defendant Sorensen represented 
to Plaintiff that she was at high risk of a debilitating stroke due to the presence of her PFO/ ASD. 
In truth, the mere presence of the defect, without more, including a history of cryptogenic stroke, 
is not a significant risk factor for stroke. Further, Sorensen passed out a Patient Information Patent 
Foreman Ovale (PFO) handout to Plaintiff. Sorensen's patient literature contained fraudulent 
misrepresentations, unsupported data and statistics, outright falsehoods, and other misleading 
statements, such as the following: 
• "Until recently, 40% of all strokes were unknown cause. We now know that most of 
these unexplained strokes may be caused by a PFO (Patent Foramen Ovale)" (Stroke 
and PFO Slide 2). 
• "Strokes resulting from septa] defects have a 50% mortality rate." 
• "PFO is diagnosed in 50-70% of patients with stroke of unknown cause" (What is 
Known About PFO and Stroke Slide 12). 
• "Continued lifelong risk of stroke ranging from 2-9% each year." (PFO Treatment 
Options Aspirin/Plavix/Coumadin Slide 17). 
• "Stroke reduction to less than 1 %" (PFO Treatment Options Catheter Closure of PFO). 
• "Septa! Defect Closure Safety and Efficacy" (Slide 28). 
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• "Our rigorous Program requirements assure that you are informed and receive the safest 
and most effective treatment" (Why Our Program Might Be Right For You Slide 30). 
These statements induced and persuaded Plaintiff to undergo a PFO closure at IHC by inducing 
fear of an imminent and debilitating stroke, downplaying safer and accepted treatment options, 
misrepresenting the indication for PFO in the medical community, and downplaying the risks of 
PFO closure. 
44. Further, Plaintiffs medical records authorized by Defendant Sorensen are replete 
with fraudulent misrepresentations, falsehoods, and other misleading statements containing 
information presented to Plaintiff to induce her to have the closure procedure. These statements 
include: 
• "Our approach is a preventative strategy. It is scientifically based, but it is an 
aggressive strategy." In fact, Dr. Sorenson's method has never been accepted in any 
scientific journal, organization, been approved for a randomized clinical trial, and/or 
the peer review process for his data and proposed indication for PFO closure. "We, 
therefore follow a preventative strategy and risk stratify patients based on the 
studies ... proposed by the American Academy ofNeurology." That is false; the AAN 
did not recommend closure outside of clinical trials and encouraged patients to 
participate in research protocols. 
• "8 studies demonstrate that very high flow is the main feature of stroke risk." In fact, 
the AAN Practice Parameter did not find an association, much less causation, of 
shunting and risk of stroke recurrence. 
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• "Randomized trials are not available currently." In reality, the Closure I trial was 
opened in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was halted due to Defendant Sorensen's medically 
unnecessary off-label PFO procedures of patients outside the trial. 
• "Coumadin is considered to be unsafe and ineffective ... based on studies." In fact, the 
SPIRIT, W ASID and W ARRS studies showed no such thing. 
• Within Plaintiffs medical records, Sorenson noted that Ms. Tapp had a history of 
migraine. That too was false, misleading, and inaccurate. Dr. Sorenson made this 
notation without any objective evidence. 
• Defendant Sorenson certified that his echocardiography lab was certified by I CAEL 
(Intersocietal Commission for Accreditation Laboratories) using the JCAEL logo on 
his echochardiogram. In fact, his lab was never accredited by I CAEL and this was 
false. 
Plaintiff was unaware of the misrepresentations and falsehoods in her medical records and instead 
trusted what the Defendants had told her during her of treatment. Further, and even if she had been 
aware of some the factual mischaracterizations, as non-expert she could not have understood their 
implications as it relates the appropriateness of her medical treatment. 
45. Ultimately, Defendant Sorensen performedthe percutaneous closure on September 
18, 2008, at Defendant IHC's Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory. The following day, a 
transthoracic echocardiogram was performed at Defendant JHC on Lisa prior to discharge. A 
color-flow doppler test was not performed to evaluate the atrial septum for a residual shunt, which 
was ostensibly one of the reasons for closing Lisa's PFO. 
46. In a patient with strong or definitive evidence for embolic stroke, the standard of 
care requires a comprehensive evaluation for all of the causes of embolic stroke. This was not 
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performed by Dr. Sorensen in his care of Plaintiff. A comprehensive evaluation for causes of 
"cryptogenic" stroke includes an MRI of the brain (which was done in this case), imaging of the 
extra cranial and intracranial cerebral arteries, 3-4 week rhythm monitoring to look for paroxysmal 
atrial fibrillation, imaging of the aorta to look for atherosclerotic disease, lower extremity venous 
doppler/ultrasound, MRV of the abdominal and pelvic veins, and a hyper coagulability workup. 
Sorensen did not conduct this evaluation on Plaintiff. 
47. Defendant IHC was aware that this type of off-label medically unnecessary PFO 
closure was being performed on hundreds of patients, including Plaintiff, during this time of 
October 2008 as Defendant Sorensen had informed Defendant IHC he would perform the 
procedure in this manner. 
48. On October 15, 2008, Lisa Tapp was seen by Defendant Sorensen for a follow-up 
visit. Lisa complained of palpitations and a rapid heart rate. Defendant Sorensen did not screen 
Lisa for atrial fibrillation, which carries with it the risk of stroke. 
49. Because of Defendants' conduct, Lisa suffere.d damages, including undergoing an 
unnecessary surgical procedure and hospital stay, as well as medical expenses, physical pain, and 
emotional anguish. 
50. Despite IHC's awareness of Sorensen's fraudulent and/or negligent practices, it did 
nothing to notify Plaintiff. Instead, IHC actively allowed Sorensen's practice to continue in order 
to profit from the thousands of unnecessary procedures performed on patients like Plaintiff. In fact, 
IHC has to this day actively concealed its knowledge about Sorensen's rogue and fraudulent 
practices at its facility from patients, third party payers, and the public, and has retained the money 
earned off of Sorensen's medically unnecessary surgeries. 
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51. The FDA issued a warning about serious erosion events with Amplatzer Septa] 
Occluder devices in October 2013. Although erosion events are not currently an issue for Lisa 
Tapp, the Amplatzer Septa! Occluder device is permanently implanted and carries this risk. 
52. IHC sent a letter to patients around February 2014 alerting patients who had an 
Amplatzer Septa! Occluder device implanted about the FDA's findings with a link to the FDA 
announcement and St. Jude patient advisory. The letter sent to patients did not mention anything 
about Dr. Sorensen, the PFO closure procedure itself, or that medical malpractice may have 
occurred. Nor did the letter inform patients, including Lisa Tapp, that the PFO closure was 
medically unnecessary to begin with, that the use of this device for PFO closure had not been 
studied, accepted, and/or approved in the medical community, and that Defendant Sorensen had 
asserted misrepresentations, falsehoods, half-truths, and engaged in other deceptive acts. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE (HEAL TH CARE MALPRACTICE} 
53. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
54. Defendants, individually, collectively, and through the acts and omissions of their 
agents, servants, employees, physicians, nurses, therapists, and technologists (hereinafter 
collectively "Defendants") accepted Plaintiff as a patient, and thereby assumed various duties of 
care. 
55. At all relevant times, Defendants held themselves out as being able to provide full 
care and treatment for patients requiring medical care of the type that Plaintiff required, including, 
but not limited to, paresthesias in the back of the neck and head and non-specific white matter 
lesions, among other things. 
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56. The degree of care and treatment provided to Plaintiff fell below the acceptable 
standards of care for the types of medical care and treatment required by Plaintiff and provided by 
Defendants. 
57. Specifically, Defendants breached the applicable standards of care in multiple ways 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiffs medical records to indicate that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Misleading Plaintiff regarding the risks and benefits associated with closure and 
regarding the necessity of treatment; 
c. Failing to obtain an adequate history which resulted in an improper ·medical 
diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate candidate for closure; 
d. Failing to conduct an adequate physical and to obtain appropriate diagnostic testing, 
which resulted in an improper medical diagnosis that Plaintiff was an appropriate 
candidate for PFO closure; Performing a medically unnecessary medical procedure 
with a device that was not FDA approved for this use; 
e. Failing to test for residual shunting after performing the PFO closure; and 
f. Failing to screen Plaintiff for atrial fibrillation when she presented with palpitations 
and a rapid heart rate. 
58. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Defendants caused Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary medical procedures, testing, and follow-up 
visits, incur unnecessary medical expenses, and experience physical injuries and emotional 
anguish. 
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59. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including by not limited to unnecessary medical 
procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional anguish. 
60. Plaintiff has therefore been injured and is entitled to recover general and special 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
61. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
62. At all relevant times, Defendants owed Plaintiff various duties of care, including 
but not limited to common law and statutory duties. 
63. Defendants, individually and collectively, breached these duties of care. 
64. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' acts and omission, 
Defendants caused personal and other injuries to Plaintiff. 
65. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
amounts to be determined at trial. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
66. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
67. Defendants, individually and collectively, represented to Plaintiff that medical 
procedures, testing, and follow-up visits were medically necessary. 
68. Defendants' representations that Plaintiff's medical procedures, testing, arid 
follow-up visits were medically necessary was, in fact, not true. 
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69. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to determine whether the representations 
regarding the necessity of Plaintiffs medical care was true. 
70. Defendants were in a better position than Plaintiff to know the true facts regarding 
Plaintiffs medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care. 
71. Defendants had a financial interest m performing medically unnecessary 
procedures, testing, and follow-up care on Plaintiff. 
72. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations, and it was reasonable for her to do 
so. 
73. Plaintiff has therefore been injured as a result of relying on Defendants' 
representations and is entitled to recover general and special damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING 
74. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
75. Defendant IHC owes a duty to patients to exercise reasonable care in the selection 
of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges to them. It also has the duty to periodically 
monitor and review the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
76. Defendant IHC breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in its selection of its 
medical staff, and in granting specialized privileges to and periodically monitoring and reviewing 
the qualifications and competency of its medical staff. 
77. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of its breach, Defendant IHC caused 
harm to Plaintiff. 
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78. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUDULANT NON-DISCLOSURE/CONCEALMENT 
79. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
80. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to disclose important facts, such as the medical 
necessity of Plaintiff's medical care, to Plaintiff. 
81. Defendants knew that the medical care Defendants provided to Plaintiff was not 
medically necessary, and failed to disclose this to Plaintiff. 
82. Plaintiff did not know that the medical care provided by Defendants was not 
medically necessary. 
83. Defendants' failure to disclose the fact that Plaintiffs medical care was not 
necessary was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's damages. Had Plaintiff known that her 
closure surgery was not necessary, Plaintiff would not have undergone the surgery. 
84. Plaintiff has been injured and is entitled to recover general and special damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD 
85. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
86. At all relevant times, Defendants had a duty and obligation to disclose to Plaintiff 
true facts concerning the medical care provided to Plaintiff by Defendants. 
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87. Defendants intentionally concealed material facts concerning Plaintiff's medical 
care from Plaintiff including, but not limited to the following: 
a. Falsifying Plaintiff's medical records to indicate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for closure; 
b. Performing medically unnecessary medical procedures with a device that was not 
FDA approved for this use; and 
c. Concealing from Plaintiff that medical procedures, testing, and follow-up care was 
unnecessary. 
88. Defendants made false statements and misrepresentations about important facts 
regarding Plaintiff's medical care. 
89. Defendants made these false statements and misrepresentations described above 
knowing that the statements were false, or with reckless disregard for their truth. 
90. Defendants made the false statements and misrepresentations to Plaintiff, with the 
intent that Plaintiff would rely on the statements. 
91. Plaintiff did reasonably rely on the false statements and misrepresentations made 
by Defendants. 
92. As a sole, proximate, and foreseeable result of Defendants' false statements and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries, including but not limited to 
unnecessary medical procedures, testing, follow-up visits, medical expenses, and emotional 
anguish. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
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93. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
94. Defendants were acting in a conspiracy to commit fraud, thereby increasing their 
profits through the performance of medically unnecessary procedures on patients, including 
Plaintiff. 
95. There was an agreement and meeting of the minds among Defendant Sorensen, 
Defendant SCG, and Defendant IHC to misrepresent the need for and induce patients, including 
Plaintiff, into undergoing medically unnecessary procedures, testing, and follow-up. Defendants 
agreed to act in concert in making these misrepresentations about the necessity of medical 
procedures to Plaintiff. 
96. There were multiple unlawful, overt acts by Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, 
and Defendant IHC in furtherance of their scheme, including without limitation, Defendants' 
fraud. 
97. As a result of this conspiracy, Defendant Sorensen, Defendant SCG, and Defendant 
IHC, should be held jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the other co-conspirators and 
the damages that Plaintiff sustained as a proximate result thereof, including without limitation 
personal injuries and other injuries. 
98. Plaintiff would further show that Defendant Sorensen and Defendant SCG were 
operating as alter egos for the purpose of perpetrating the above described conspiracy. There was 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the company and the 
individual did not exist. Observing the corporate form will sanction this conspiracy, promote 
injustice, and allow an inequitable result. 
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EQUITABLE TOLLING/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT 
99. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully 
herein. 
100. Because of Defendants' concealment of material facts and misleading conduct, 
Plaintiff was not aware of her causes of action. 
10 I. Plaintiff found out about her cause of action only after learning of Defendants' 
conduct through lawyer advertising in 2017. 
102. Defendants took affirmative steps to conceal Plaintiffs cause of action. Given 
Defendants' concealment and misleading conduct, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the cause of action earlier. 
103. IHC, through its employees, physicians, internal audit, and Sorensen's own 
representations was well aware that Sorensen had performed medically unnecessary PFO and ASD 
closures on patients such as Plaintiff, but chose not to conduct a more expansive audit and/or 
inform patients that had an unnecessary surgery. 
I 04. Neither Sorenson, nor IHC ever notified Plaintiff that she had received an 
unnecessary procedure, that she was never indicated for the surgery to begin with, that the device 
implanted into Plaintiff was never medically necessary, was retained in her body for no medical 
purpose, and that the informed consent contained fraudulent, misleading, and/or incomplete 
statements. Neither Sorenson, nor IHC, ever compensated Plaintiff for the unnecessary medical 
surgery she underwent by reimbursing the costs of the procedure. 
105. Neither Sorensen, nor IHC, ever made a public statement, sent a letter, made a 
public announcement, or issued a press release to inform patients, such as Plaintiff Lisa Tapp, may 
have had a medically unnecessary PFO closure at IHC at any time. 
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106. Defendants' misrepresentations and misleading conduct constitutes fraudulent 
concealment that equitably tolls any proffered statute of limitation that may otherwise bar the 
recovery sought by Plaintiff. 
107. Plaintiff did not know, nor should have known, of the causes of action against 
Defendants prior to being put on notice of Defendants' potential liability in 2017. She neither 
discovered, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying her causes of action before 
any proffered statute of limitations period expired. 
108. As a result of Defendants' concealment of the true character, quality and nature of 
their conduct, they are estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. Defendants' 
affirmative acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiffs injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently in 2017. Such 
conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b ). 
I 09. Defendants' conduct, because it was purposely committed, was known or should 
have been known by them to be dangerous, heedless, reckless, and without regard to the 
consequences or the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment (under URCP: Tier 3) against Defendants in an 
amount to be determined by the trier of fact for the following damages: 
a. For special damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
b. For general damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
c. For pre and post judgment interest on all special damages pursuant to Utah law; 
d. For costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed by law; and 
e. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of November 2017. 
Isl Rhome D. Zabriskie 
Rhome D. Zabriskie 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC 
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, LLP 
Rand P. Nolen (Pro Hae Vice submission in 
progress) 
David L. Hobbs (Pro Hae Vice submission in 
progress) 
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 4000 
Houston, TX 77056-6109 
Telephone: (713)621-7944 
Facsimile: (713) 621-9638 
Email: rand_nolen@fleming-law.com 
Email: david_hobbs@fleming-law.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following 
via the Court's ECF filing system and/or Email on 21 sT day of November, 2017: 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Sammi V. Anderson 
John (Jack) T. Nelson 
Mitch M. Longson 
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300 
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Michael J. Miller 
Strong & Hanni 
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Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, MD. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
/s/ Rhome D. Zabriskie 
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This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 2018 before the Honorable Judge 
Barry Lawrence. Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp. Alan Bradshaw and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant IHC 
Health Services, Inc., and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke appeared on behalf of Defendants 
Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group. The matter before the Court was a 
hearing on Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
The Court notes the relevant procedural history. After plaintiff filed her Complaint, a 
motion to dismiss was filed. followed by a request to file an amended complaint. On February 
20. 2018, the Court held argument on the motion to amend and rejected defendants' futility 
arguments in an Order dated March 7, 2018. After the Amended Complaint, was filed another 
set of motions to dismiss were filed: they were heard on May 14, 2018. The Court announced its 
ruling in a telephone conference on May 25, 2018. That ruling is reflected herein: but to the 
extent that ruling differs from this Order, the oral ruling should control. 
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Having considered the motions, the Court dismisses the fraud/misrepresentation claims 
against IHC Health Services, Inc. and the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants. Other than that, 
the Court denies the motions, leaving the negligence claims against Dr. Sorensen, the negligence 
claims against IHC Health Services, Inc., and the fraud/misrepresentation claims against Dr. 
Sorensen. 
The Court concludes that it cannot rule on the statute of limitation/repose defense based 
on the pleadings. Plaintiff is not obligated to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in 
response to the statute of limitation/repose defense. The Plaintiff is not obligated to meet a 
heightened pleading requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending 
defense. Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, ,r 6, 122 P.3d 891, 
893-94 ("the burden of pleading the inappHcability of [privilege] is not initially on the plaintiff, 
and it is not incumbent on the plaintiff or party filing a complaint to anticipate an affirmative 
defense which the answer may disclose"). 
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants' argument to the contrary, and there is a 
distinction for cases where the complaint is "facially invalid" or untimely. The Court reads 
Defendants' cited cases as standing for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to 
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, then the affirmative defense can be 
resolved in a Rule 12 motion. That is not the case here where the facts of fraudulent concealment 
are not in the complaint and can't be unless the issue is before the Court in full. 
In Tucker v. State F'arm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ,I 8, 53 P.3d 947, all of the 
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applicable dates were in the complaint and so the court ruled as a matter of law. There was no 
assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of limitation, and so it was not inappropriate for 
the court to rule. Again, it appears to the Court that all facts necessary to decide the Rule 12 
motion were in the complaint, which again is a far cry from this case. Van De Grift v. State, 2013 
UT 11, 299 P.3d 1043 was dismissed on immunity grounds because there is immunity for claims 
that arise based on fraud and the complaint alleged facts of fraud. Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2017 UT 67 involved exhaustion of remedies, which is a jurisdictional issue. There the complaint 
made clear that there was no exhaustion. And, in footnote the Bivens court said: "We do not hold 
today that a plaintiffs complaint must affirmatively plead exhaustion of legal remedies." And in 
Lowery v. Brigham Young University, 2004 UT App 182, the complaint on its face reflected 
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that as a matter of law, the discovery rule 
could not apply and, therefore, the court could rule on the pleadings. None of these cases stand 
for the proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary 
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of particularity. The issue 
of whether the plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under § 78B-3-404 will have 
to be based upon what we learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or 
at trial. Accordingly, the Court DENIES all of the statute of limitations issues raised by the 
Defendants. 
The Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims should be consolidated into one 
medical malpractice claim. While the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does have a broad 
definition of what a malpractice claim is for procedural purposes, the Court is not aware of any 
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authority that prevents a plaintiff from asserting alternative facts of fraud or negligence against 
Dr. Sorensen, and the elements of each would have to be proven at trial. However, the Court 
notes that it appears that there are multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud, 
and The Court will not dismiss those at this time. The plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its 
claims. But ultimately at trial, there will be one negligence claim against Dr. Sorensen and one 
fraud claim and if the standard of care encompasses various things that's fine, but those are not 
separate claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Sorensen Defendants' motion. 
IHC Health Services, Inc.' s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims is 
GRANTED. It is important to note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated 
with the 2008 surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to statute of 
limitation/repose. The allegations of IHC Health Services, Inc.'s fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to 
have surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where the plaintiff 
lumps the "defendants" in together and there is not one fact in the complaint that would support 
that IHC Health Services, Inc. was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated 
in the complaint that even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under 
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that IHC Health Services, Inc. was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff in 2008. So 
that claim against IHC Health Services, Inc. is DISMISSED. The fraud claim against Dr. 
Sorensen will survive and the motion DENIED. There are ample allegations of facts supporting 
this fraudulent inducement theory in 2008 by Dr. Sorensen. But there is absolutely nothing 
demonstrating any fraud by IHC Health Services, Inc. or any sort of illegal conduct or wrong by 
IHC Health Services, Inc. and the predicate for a conspiracy claim has not been alleged. There 
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are no facts alleged against IHC Health Services, Inc. of fraud and conspiracy at the time the 
surgery was done. 
The conspiracy claim, like the fraud claims, is governed by Rule 9 and Rule 9 requires a 
showing of particularity. Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966 (1982); Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003 
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (2003); Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, 
344 P.3d 156. Having dismissed fraud claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. the Court is 
compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between the Defendants as well. (Having dismissed 
the underlying predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim), there can be no 
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.). The Court GRANTS Defendants' motions as to 
conspiracy and DISMISSES the conspiracy claim against all Defendants. 
In summary, the Court: 
GRANTS IHC Health Services, Inc.'s motion as to the misrepresentation claims and 
DISMISSES the Third; Fifth; and Sixth Claims for Relief against IHC Health Services, Inc.; 
GRANTS the Defendants' motions as to the conspiracy claim and DISMISSES the Seventh 
Claim for Relief against all Defendants; and otherwise 
DENIES the motions to dismiss. 
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
and seal at the top of the first page*** 
----------END OF DOCUMENT-----------
Approved as to form: 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM 
Isl Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of David Hobbs) 
David Hobbs 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
John T. (Jack) Nelson 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
STRONG & HANNI 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of Michael J. Miller) 
Michael J. Miller 
Attorneys for Sorensen Defendants 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
A VOICE: Welcome to CenturyLink Conferencing. 
Please enter your passcode followed by the pound or hash key, 
and I'll connect you. 
Please hold while I confirm your passcode. 
Thank you. Your passcode is confirmed. When you 
hear the tone, you will be the 8th person to join the meeting. 
THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everybody. 
This is Judge Lawrence. Who do we have on the line. Why don't 
we start with the plaintiffs and then go to Dr. Sorensen's 
lawyers and then IHC. 
MR. NOLEN: Your Honor, Rand Nolen and David Hobbs 
for Dr.-- for the Plaintiff. 
MR. ZABRISKIE: And also for the Plaintiff, Rhone 
Zabriskie is present on the line. 
MR. MILLER: Michael Miller on behalf of Dr. Sorensen 
and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group, and I think Kathleen Abke is 
on the line too. 
MR. BRADSHAW: 
for IHC Health Services. 
This is Allen Bradshaw and Jack Nelson 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. WARDS: Your Honor, this is -- Your Honor, this 
is Drew Wards. 
I represent St. Mark's in some of these related 
cases, and they said we could listen in. 


























THE COURT: All right. Anybody object? 
MR. NOLEN: 
THE COURT: 
Plaintiffs do not object, Your Honor. 
Okay. All right. 
MR. BRADSHAW: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks for your patience on 
this. 
So I'm prepared to rule on the motion to dismiss. 
And then perhaps, more important than that, I was hoping we'd 
have a conversation about where we go from here. 
Let me tell you the way I ruled. Then I will go 
through my ruling. And then, as I said, we'll talk about the 
process going forward. 
I am granting IHC's motion as to the fraud claims 
against IHC, and I'm also granting the --
Did somebody just join us? Can everybody hear me? 
MR. NOLEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: So I'm going to -- I'm going to dismiss 
the fraud claims against IHC, and I'm going to dismiss the 
conspiracy claim. Other than that, I'm going to deny the 
motion, so it will basically leave negligence claims against 
Dr. Sorensen, negligence claims against IHC, and fraud claims 
against Dr. Sorensen. 
So let me go through my analysis. 
All right. First, with respect to the statute of 
limitations, and a lot of this is pretty similar to my ruling 


























on the futility motion. 
The question of statute of limitations, basically the 
first -- the issue is can I rule on the statute of limitations 
defense based on the pleadings, and I conclude the answer is 
no. 
And, again, I concluded that the Plaintiff did not 
have an obligation to plead with particularity facts in 
response to the statute of limitation defense in their 
complaint. 
As I have said previously, the Plaintiff is not 
obligated to meet a heightened pleading requirement relating to 
facts that would serve to defeat an impending defense. 
I, again, reiterate the Zuma Dacus case at 2005, Utah 
Appellate 325, where they said, quote, "The burden of pleading 
the inapplicability of, in that case, the defense of privilege 
is not initially on the Plaintiff, and it is not incumbent on 
the party filing the complaint to anticipate an affirmative 
defense which the answer may disclose. 11 
I am not persuaded by the defendant's argument to the 
contrary in that there's a distinction for cases where the 
complaint is, quote, ''facially invalid or untimely.'' 
I've read those cases, and I think those cases stand 
for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to 
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, 
then it can be ruled -- resolved in a Rule 12 motion. 


























That is obviously not the case here where the facts 
of fraudulent concealment are not in the complaint and can't be 
unless the -- the issue isn't before the Court in full. 
Let me just mention a couple of the cases that the 
defendants raised. First was the Tucker case. 
Give me a second. 
Oh, in there, all of the applicable dates were in the 
complaint, and so the Court ruled as a matter of law. There 
was no assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of 
limitations, and so it was not inappropriate for the Court to 
rule, though I do note that they went beyond the complaint and 
treated it as a Rule 56 motion. 
Again, it appears to me that all facts necessary to 
decide the Rule 12 motion were in the complaint which, again, 
is a far cry from this case. 
Similarly, some of the cases that Tucker was cited 
for stand for that same proposition, and I'm not persuaded that 
they lead to some sort of a distinction between facially and --
valid and invalid defenses. 
I note specifically the Vandergriff case, which was 
cited 2013, Utah 11. 
That claim was dismissed on immunity grounds because 
there is immunity for claims that arise based on fraud, and the 
complaint alleged facts of fraud. 
the issue here. 
Very different than the --


























In Bivens, in fact, I think actually the Court stated 
just the opposite. That was 2017, Utah 67. First of all, that 
was an exhaustion issue, which is a jurisdictional issue, and 
the Court made clear that there was -- the complaint made clear 
that they hadn't exhausted. 
I do note that footnote 6 in that case said, quote, 
"We do not hold today that a plaintiff's complaint must 
affirmatively plead exhaustion of legal remedies." 
Also, I just wanted to mention the Larry case 2004, 
Utah Appellate 182, where the complaint on its face reflected 
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that, as a 
matter of law the discovery rule could not apply, and therefore 
the Court could rule on the pleadings. 
So none of those cases, in my view, stand for the 
proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the 
obligation to state facts necessary to defeat a statute of 
limitations defense with any -- at all, let alone a degree of 
particularity. 
So that being the case, the issue of whether the 
plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under code 
78B-3-404 will have to be based upon what -- what we learn 
factually in discovery and to be decided at a summary judgment 
or at trial. 
Accordingly, all of the statute of limitations 
arguments raised by either IHC or Dr. Sorensen are denied and 


























that issue will go forward. 
Now, the issues relating to the interpretation of 
that statute are thus not pertinent to this ruling. I will 
address them in a little while though after I conclude this 
ruling, because, obviously, those are important issues that we 
need to make -- to determine before we figure out where we're 
going in the next step of the process. 
So the statute of limitations defense is -- is 
rejected, and all motions in that regard are denied. 
Now, with respect to the miscellaneous arguments: 
First Dr. Sorensen argues that all of the claims 
should be consolidated into one medical malpractice claim 
relying on 78B-3-403(17). 
While the Medical Malpractice Act does have a broad 
definition of what a malpractice claim is for purposes -- for 
procedural purposes, I'm not aware of any authority that would 
prevent a plaintiff in a lawsuit from asserting alternate facts 
of fraud or negligence against Dr. Sorensen, and the elements 
of each would have to be proven at trial. 
However, I would note that it appears that there are 
multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud, and 
I'm not going to dismiss those at this time. 
The Plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its --
its claims, but ultimately, when we get to trial, there will be 
one negligence claim and there will be one fraud claim, and, 


























you know, frankly it -- in a negligence claim, it's all going 
to be based on a breach of a standard of care, and if that 
standard of care encompasses various things, that's fine. 
Those aren't separate claims though. 
But as I said, I'm not going to dismiss any claims at 
this time, but the Plaintiff needs to be mindful that as we 
work towards trial, that if we get to trial, there aren't going 
to be a number of negligence claims. There's going to be one, 
and it can have subparts, but there will be one negligence 
claim. 
Now, as I mentioned, with IHC's motion to dismiss the 
fraud claim, that motion is granted. 
Now, it's important to note that there's a 
distinction here between the fraud associated with the 2008 
surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that 
is relevant to statute of limitations. 
The allegations of IHC's fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp 
to have this surgery are nonexistent. There is nothing but 
conclusory statements where the Piaintiff lumps the, quote, 
defendants in together in asserting some of these claims, but 
there is not one fact in the complaint that would support that 
IHC was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. 
There are ample facts supporting alleged fraudulent 
inducement by Dr. Sorensen and so, obviously, those claims will 
proceed. But there is no fact stated in the complaint that I 


























found that -- that even alleges, let alone with any degree of 
particularity, that IHC was involved in the fraud allegedly 
perpetuated on Ms. Tapp in 2008. 
So that claim is dismissed. 
Similarly -- give me one second while I look at my 
notes. 
Finally, Sorensen has filed a motion to dismiss the 
fraud and conspiracy claims. As I said, the fraud claim 
against Dr. Sorensen will survive. 
There's ample allegations of fact supporting this 
fraudulent inducement theory in 2008. 
However, as there is absolutely nothing demonstrating 
any fraud by IHC or any sort of illegal or wrong conduct by 
IHC, I don't believe that that the predicate for a 
conspiracy claim has beeri proven, so the conspiracy claim is 
denied as well. 
And let me make very clear that, in looking at the 
complaint, the fraud and conspiracy claims I am dismissing have 
to do with any alleged fraud or conspiracy at the time this 
surgery was done in 2008. That is what the complaint alleges. 
There are no facts supporting that, and that's why those claims 
will be dismissed. 
And let me just also say that the conspiracy claim, 
like the fraud claim, is also governed by Rule 9. Rule 9, it 
appears to me, does, in Utah, require the similar showing of 


























particularity. I'll just throw out a couple of cases that I 
saw that supported that. 
The Williams v. State Farm case, 656 P.2d 966, the 
Corollas case, 2003 Utah Appellate 339, and the Fidelity case, 
2015 Utah Appellate 19. 
So having dismissed IHC's fraud claim. I believe I 
am compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between these 
parties as well. 
So, again, going forward, we have three areas of 
claims. First are the negligence claims against IHC relating 
to the surgery, second are the negligence claims against 
Dr. Sorensen relating to the surgery, third are the fraud 
claims against Dr. Sorensen relating to the surgery. 
So that is the end of the order. 
Do I have any volunteer to go through -- to get a 
copy of the transcript and draft an order for me reflecting 
that ruling? 
MR. NOLEN: Your Honor, plaintiffs will be happy to 
do it. 
THE COURT: All right. I would ask you to get the 
transcript. Go as close as you can so that there's not much of 
a dispute between the parties on that. 
Having ruled that way, the defendant -- defendants 
are going to be required to answer, let's say by June 8th, that 
will be the date by which the parties should file their answer. 



























MR. NOLEN: Your Honor, we've -- we have already --
when we -- when you ruled previously 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. NOLEN: -- you instructed us to answer as well as 
file the motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you. Good. 
All right. So, now the only thing else that I have 
to say is not related to this motion and in dicta and take it 
for however you like it. 
It seems to me that we now, by the motions to 
dismiss, by ruling the way I did, I didn't need to get to the 
statute. As I see it, that statute and the interpretation of 
that statute will govern the way in which we proceed in this 
case, most notably discovery. 
It seems to me that if IHC is correct in their 
interpretation of that statute, then discovery will be fairly 
limited and would not encompass a huge sort of undertaking 
regarding what happened between Sorensen and IHC and all of 
that stuff. Whereas, if the Plaintiffs are correct, they would 
be, as they requested it at the last hearing, asking for a 
full-blown discovery that, frankly, I thought sounded like a 
fishing expedition. 
I am trying to figure out what the best way to 
proceed is. Let me give you my -- sort of a proposal, and then 


























I'd like to hear from you folks and tell me what you think. 
My thought is to have you meet and confer and see if 
you can come up with some sort of a discovery plan. If you 
can't, what I'm wondering is whether -- and I'm frankly not 
optimistic you're going to reach an agreement on that. What 
I'm wondering about is whether each side can submit some sort 
of a -- sort of discovery plan on what the parameters of 
discovery are, and perhaps it would be -- you would submit them 
to me, and at that time I could perhaps enter an order where 
I've gone through what the statute means and limit discovery 
accordingly. 
At that point, you guys could determine whether you 
want to go ahead with discovery or wanting to perhaps take it 
in interlocutory appeal. 
I am mindful of the fact that at some point the 
determination of what that statute means is going to have to be 
addressed upstairs. And I'm wondering if that is the first 
opportunity at which that can happen. 
If not, then we're going to have to complete 
discovery and have an evidentiary hearing. And I will tell 
you, I am very compelled to believe that a bifurcation pursuant 
to 78B-2-114 is required in this case, not legally required, 
but required for the issue of judicial economy, one, and number 
two, it would be, I think, unfair and prejudicial to the 
defendants in what might just be a negligence claim, and 


























certainly is as to IHC, to hear facts of a potential fraudulent 
scheme later that is not -- that's not relevant to the merits 
but would be relevant to statute of limitations. 
So I am mindful of the fact that you guys need a 
ruling from me on what that statute means, and and I'm 
trying to figure out the best way to give that to you so that 
we are are as economic as we can in moving through this 
case. 
So let me hear from you first, Mr. Nolen. 
have any thoughts on how to proceed at this point? 
Do you 
MR. NOLEN: Your Honor, I would, having heard the 
Court's thoughts, actually think that we might could tailor 
something through a meet and confer. And once we had that meet 
and confer, if we if we can't agree for some reason, and 
actually, as a as a group, we've actually been fairly 
cooperative with each other, but if we can't agree on a 
discovery -- a discovery plan that is acceptable to us, we 
would just simply advise the Court in writing, just jointly, 
and then within ten days or 14 days, whatever the Court 
prefers, submit our own separate discovery plans. 
THE COURT: 
next. Any thoughts? 
Okay. Mr. Bradshaw, let me hear from you 
MR. BRADSHAW: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 
We -- we certainly are willing to sit down and 
discuss a discovery plan, and I would agree with the notion 


























that discovery related to the affirmative fraudulent 
concealment issue would be extremely limited. I -- I think 
that the biggest limiting factor is, is that under that statute 
there has to be some reliance by the Plaintiff on the conduct, 
so we're really talking about interactions between either 
Sorensen and --
THE COURT: I am fully along -- along that position 
on this statute. You don't need to reargue it, but I am 
mindful of that. 
MR. BRADSHAW: That's fine, Your Honor. So -- so 
that's one thing. 
I would like to introduce one other thought with 
respect to this, which I think you're right that we're going to 
need an interpretation of the statute, and I would suggest that 
the procedural portion of the Court's ruling where I think we 
have some disagreement would also be critical, because this 
case is obviously setting the landscape with respect to 
800 cases. 
And let me just articulate what I think that issue 
is. As I understand the Court's ruling, the Court is 
recognizing that, under this line of cases where there is a --
an affirmative defense that appears on the face of the 
complaint, our argument was obviously that there is one fact 
and one fact alone, which is that when the medical care 
occurred, because this is a statute of repose. 


























As I understand the Court's ruling, what the Court is 
saying is the cases we're citing are distinguishable because 
the issue that would have to have been pled in the complaint is 
affirmative fraudulent concealment and all of those facts. And 
I think that guidance from the appellate court with respect to 
the way I read all of these cases, including the federal cases 
and the state cases, is is that there is only one fact that 
makes the complaint facially untimely, which is the date of the 
medical care. And so that's where this is is either 
throwing us into this context of discovery or we're into the 
fact that they have not pled affirmative conduct that would 
resurrect their claim. 
I think that if we get to the point that we have to 
have this statute interpreted and this procedural issue becomes 
absolutely critical, and I think it's a really discreet issue 
for which the appellate court can answer that question and 
guide all of these cases. 
THE COURT: Well, I -- I respectively just totally 
disagree with your position on this, and I've said it three 
times. You guys can -- frankly, you know, what I thought, what 
I was wondering about was whether there should be sort of a 
compendium order from me. Perhaps we wait on the order 
grant -- or denying the motions to dismiss, and if you guys 
can't agree on discovery, I issue one big order where it 
includes the motion to dismiss and it includes the -- the 


























statutory interpretation arguments. And if all of this is 
going to be interlocutory, I don't think you have a matter of 
right on any of this stuff, but perhaps, at that point, if 
there's just one order that addresses both the motion to 
dismiss and the statute, perhaps -- perhaps that might be 
something that everybody would agree that needs to be taken up 
on an interlock. And maybe -- maybe that's the way that we 
should think about doing this. 
MR. BRADSHAW: That -- that's what I'm suggesting, 
Your Honor. I always get nervous when you say you disagree. 
I -- that's what I was trying to suggest. 
articulated it very well. 
I don't think I 
THE COURT: I -- I personally don't have a problem 
with that. And I will tell you all, I've -- you know, we have 
been at CLEs with appellate judges, and I have specifically 
asked, if I have an issue and I think that, you know, it would 
really help if you guys decided it on an interlocutory basis, 
would it help if I chimed in, and the answer was, yes. And I 
would certainly at so we are, you know, through phase one of 
this process with the motions to dismiss. Once we get through 
phase 2 and we're talking about the interpretation of the 
statute, I would certainly be willing to include language in 
that order to the effect that, given the enormity of the number 
of cases, the importance of this issue, that this really is 
something that they need to take a look at sooner rather than 



























I think that makes sense. But, you know, once again, 
it's -- it's still not a matter of right. So I guess we'd have 
to just hope that they take it now. I think that would make 
a lot of sense from a judicial economy standpoint. 
Mr. Miller, I guess I skipped over you. What -- do 
you have any thoughts on this? 
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I think Mr. Nolen stated it 
succinctly, and I think that that's appropriate, yes. I think 
a meet and confer, as Your Honor suggested, would be very 
appropriate to see if we can come up with a plan, and if we 
cannot, then submit separate sides. 
And it may be that we can agree on, you know, 50, 60, 
70 percent, whatever the number is, and then submit the rest 
for the Court's ruling. I think that would be great. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we -- how quickly can 
you guys have your meet and confer? 
MR. NOLEN: Your Honor, I'm sure I can do it next 
week. I don't know what the other side's schedule is, but I 
certainly can do it next week. 
THE COURT: What if I just said within two weeks the 
parties are going to meet and confer. So that would be by 
June 8th, the parties will meet and confer and try to submit a 
stipulated discovery plan. 
I'm not going to hold my breath, but have at it. And 


























then if you can't, how about within -- within two weeks after 
that, by June 22nd, each party submits their discovery plan, 
their proposal. 
You really -- you -- it doesn't need to in-depth 
refer to the statute and the statutory interpretation. I've 
got all of that that I need. But it probably would be helpful 
to simply say, from the IHC's perspective, based upon the 
arguments we've submitted, we think that, you know, discovery 
should be limited in the following regards, or whatever. 
So don't make it too long. Just tell me what 
I'm talking timelines. I'm talking discovery you want. 
amounts of discovery. I'm talking, you know, precisely what 
vehicles and mechanisms of discovery. And -- and -- and I 
think this probably will apply to the Plaintiff and not the 
Defendant, you're going to have to demonstrate some sort of 
proportionality issue here. 
Rule 26 in Utah is governed by principals of 
proportionality, and I realize in one sense there are lots of 
cases and this is a biggie and if you look at it in the 
totality. But this case in and of itself, you know, not so 
much. It is a tier three case and tier three does state some 
limits. 
But I -- I do want you -- the Plaintiff to address 
the issue of proportionality, if what you're going to be 
requesting, and I think it is, a fairly broad examination of --


























of lots of things involving IHC and Dr. Sorensen. 
Does that timeline make sense? 
MR. NOLEN: It's fine with Plaintiff, Your Honor. 
MR. MILLER: Yes. This is Mike Miller, I agree. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Your Honor, this is Mr. Bradshaw. 
I -- that -- I -- I agree with that timeline. I'm a little bit 
confused by is this to the exclusion of preparing an order with 
respect to the Court's ruling today --
THE COURT: No. 
MR. BRADSHAW: if I have [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Let's have that done on a parallel basis. 
And then what I will do is I will just -- I think what I'll do 
is I will not sign any order on this motion until I sign the 
other order. So it will be signed the same day. 
So they -- that's -- I'm thinking that that might 
work. 
If we just sort of do that parallel and I sign them 
both on the same day, it will have the same effect. 
Does anybody see a probiem with that? 
MR. NOLEN: Plaintiffs does not, Your Honor. No, 
that's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. So -- so let me -- let's 
reiterate. 
So Mr. Nolen is going to prepare the order relating 
to the motion to dismiss. See if you can reach an agreement on 


























that and then submit it to the Court. 
I'm not going to sign that just yet. 
In the meantime, by June 8th, the parties will meet 
and confer to try to agree to a discovery plan. If they can't 
agree, then by June 22nd the parties will each submit their 
own -- all three parties will submit their own request for a 
discovery plan. 
At that point, the matter will be -- it's -- I'm sure 
I will remember, but would somebody file a request to submit 
after both -- after all three of those plans or two of those 
plans, however you guys divide them up, are done. 
At that point, I will shortly thereafter issue an 
order where I go through the interpretation of that statute and 
then make conclusions about the limits on discovery. 
And I 
frankly, that I 
you kriow, I will tell you, I don't think, 
I have looked at this again pretty intently 
after our last hearing, and I -- I still believe, I think, that 
the fraud at the outset that is alleged of Dr. Sorensen, is --
is not precluded by the statute. Frankly, that affects only 
Dr. Sorensen. I don't think that affects IHC. 
Number one. 
Number two, I firmly believe that the term 
''affirmative act of fraudulent concealment'' has meaning. And, 
you know, if you look at the cases, I -- I -- I have to ascribe 
some meaning to that. And so keep those two things in mind. 


























I will -- you know, I'm still sort of going through 
the cases and making sure that I feel comfortable with this. 
But I just wanted to let you know, there's nothing that I've 
seen this time around that changes very materially what I 
what I thought I read, what I thought I concluded on the 
futility motion. 
So for whatever that's worth. 
So I will look forward to hearing from you folks, 
assuming that the matter is submitted to me on June 22nd. 
I'm -- I would hope that within the next few weeks after that, 
frankly, that I have an order from you on the interpretation of 
the statute and therefore the parameters of discovery. 
So we'll just have to take this one step at a time, 
but I think that makes sense. 
Does anybody have any comments they'd like to say 
before we close here? 
MR. NOLEN: Plaintiffs do not, Your Honor. 
MR. MILLER: Nothing further. Mike Miller. Thank 
you. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right, everybody. Have a good 
extended weekend, and we will talk to you soon. 
MR. NOLEN: Thank you. 
MR. BRADSHAW: Thank you. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you. 
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1 MS. ABKE: Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Bye. 
3 (PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
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